OVERCOMING THE KOREAN CRISIS: SHORT- AND LONG-TERM OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS BY A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE
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A military solution to North Korean nuclear crisis is now widely regarded as unacceptable. The US administration’s new policy was seen by Kim Jong Il as aiming at regime change. The failure to address this concerns in October 2002 led to North Korean creating the “nuclear deterrent.” Even short of a war the collapse of Pyongyang regime would mean the disappearance of the country itself.absorption of North by South. The occupation won’t be peaceful, given the differences between Northerners and Southerners. “Slow-burning” conflict can continue for decades as a far-eastern edition of Israel-Palestinian conflict. The change in paradigm of the regime could instead ease not only WMD but other concerns. Kim Jong Il’s state differs from that of his father, it can no longer be described as Stalinist. The economy has already changed from a centrally planned one to a mixed type, combining state, capitalist, semiprivate and “shadow” sectors. Further transformation could include main power bodies (military, party, local, secret services) creating economic conglomerates resembling South Korean “chaebols.” Nationalistic ideology becomes a basis for legitimacy of Kim Jong Il’s clan power and for deeper integra- tion with South Korea. But Pyongyang would probably try to keep its nuclear weapons at all costs, even if in the course of 6- party talks which could agree to forego the nuclear program as well as other WMD production and exports (Indian model). Sanctions and isolation cannot be a final option, and provided the conditions for regime transformation would be secured, such a solution could be better than any other.
Abstract
A military solution to North Korean nuclear crisis is now widely regarded as unacceptable. The US administration’s new policy was seen by Kim Jong Il as aiming at regime change. The failure to address this concerns in October 2002 led to North Korean creating the “nuclear deterrent.” Even short of a war the collapse of Pyongyang regime would mean the disappearance of the country itself.absorption of North by South. The occupation won’t be peaceful, given the differences between Northerners and Southerners. “Slow-burning” conflict can continue for decades as a far-eastern edition of Israel-Palestinian conflict. The change in paradigm of the regime could instead ease not only WMD but other concerns. Kim Jong Il’s state differs from that of his father, it can no longer be described as Stalinist. The economy has already changed from a centrally planned one to a mixed type, combining state, capitalist, semiprivate and “shadow” sectors. Further transformation could include main power bodies (military, party, local, secret services) creating economic conglomerates resembling South Korean “chaebols.” Nationalistic ideology becomes a basis for legitimacy of Kim Jong Il’s clan power and for deeper integra- tion with South Korea. But Pyongyang would probably try to keep its nuclear weapons at all costs, even if in the course of 6- party talks which could agree to forego the nuclear program as well as other WMD production and exports (Indian model). Sanctions and isolation cannot be a final option, and provided the conditions for regime transformation would be secured, such a solution could be better than any other.