Kim Jong-un Inherits the Bomb
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North Korea’s nuclear program has a long history, which serves as a warning thatthe program is likely to have a long future. The Kim regime’s nuclear weapons program will be used by successor Kim Jong-un and his associates for their own benefit and not for the benefit of the North Korean people, and any negotiations relating to this program are likely to be slowed down by Pyongyang’s leadership transition but not abandoned. Nuclear talks can accomplish at least four things for a successor North Korean regime. First, they can provide much-needed foreign aid that can be dispensed by the new regime to establish its reputation as a provider for the people. Second, talks can signal international forgiveness for North Korea’s 2010 West Sea attacks on South Korea, which Kim Jong-un is being given credit for. Third,talks will confirm that North Korea is a nuclear weapons state, thus setting the stage for negotiations over nuclear arms reduction rather than nuclear arms elimination. And fourth, talks can validate Kim Jong-un as the new leader of North Korea, just as the 1994 talks signaled that the United States accepted Kim Jong-il as his father’s successor. In short, talks will strengthen the new Kim Jong-un regime but they will fail to end the regime’s nuclear weapons program.
Abstract
North Korea’s nuclear program has a long history, which serves as a warning thatthe program is likely to have a long future. The Kim regime’s nuclear weapons program will be used by successor Kim Jong-un and his associates for their own benefit and not for the benefit of the North Korean people, and any negotiations relating to this program are likely to be slowed down by Pyongyang’s leadership transition but not abandoned. Nuclear talks can accomplish at least four things for a successor North Korean regime. First, they can provide much-needed foreign aid that can be dispensed by the new regime to establish its reputation as a provider for the people. Second, talks can signal international forgiveness for North Korea’s 2010 West Sea attacks on South Korea, which Kim Jong-un is being given credit for. Third,talks will confirm that North Korea is a nuclear weapons state, thus setting the stage for negotiations over nuclear arms reduction rather than nuclear arms elimination. And fourth, talks can validate Kim Jong-un as the new leader of North Korea, just as the 1994 talks signaled that the United States accepted Kim Jong-il as his father’s successor. In short, talks will strengthen the new Kim Jong-un regime but they will fail to end the regime’s nuclear weapons program.
참고문헌 (17)
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