Informal Political System in North Korea: Systematic Corruption of “Power-Wealth Symbiosis”
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This paper takes note of the continuity and changes of the North Korea’s suryong dictatorial system, and elucidates the informal political system of North Korea focusing on the systematic corruption of “power-wealth symbiosis.” The following are the main outcomes of this study. First, the command economy of the North Korean suryong dictatorship brought about political clientelism. Second, the current North Korean clientelism operates by means of “power-wealth symbiosis” mechanism. Third, with the marketization and the changes in the political environment, the behaviors, relations, and interactions of the actors in North Korean regime became unstable. As a result, the necessity for protective mechanism of individual actors has surged, the informal network of “patron-client” has become an institution of dayto- day lives. Fourth, the North Korean market economy has evolved for more than twenty years. However, following the informal political system of dictatorship, the fissure within the patron sector has deepened, disrupting the formation of a civil society that is able to confront the state and the bureaucracy. Finally, the current corruption network of “power-wealth symbiosis” has positively acted for the continuity of the suryong dictatorship. But in the mid-to-long term, the change in rules of the game might instigate the network to act a rationalist one that leads the public opinion on social changes in times of sudden transformation. Also, the main actors of the informal political system that leads the clientelism are likely to emerge as a new capitalist class when the North Korean regime transition takes place.
Abstract
This paper takes note of the continuity and changes of the North Korea’s suryong dictatorial system, and elucidates the informal political system of North Korea focusing on the systematic corruption of “power-wealth symbiosis.” The following are the main outcomes of this study. First, the command economy of the North Korean suryong dictatorship brought about political clientelism. Second, the current North Korean clientelism operates by means of “power-wealth symbiosis” mechanism. Third, with the marketization and the changes in the political environment, the behaviors, relations, and interactions of the actors in North Korean regime became unstable. As a result, the necessity for protective mechanism of individual actors has surged, the informal network of “patron-client” has become an institution of dayto- day lives. Fourth, the North Korean market economy has evolved for more than twenty years. However, following the informal political system of dictatorship, the fissure within the patron sector has deepened, disrupting the formation of a civil society that is able to confront the state and the bureaucracy. Finally, the current corruption network of “power-wealth symbiosis” has positively acted for the continuity of the suryong dictatorship. But in the mid-to-long term, the change in rules of the game might instigate the network to act a rationalist one that leads the public opinion on social changes in times of sudden transformation. Also, the main actors of the informal political system that leads the clientelism are likely to emerge as a new capitalist class when the North Korean regime transition takes place.
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