Confirmatory yet Sensitive to Posterior Probability: A Note on the Semantic Composition of Korean Conditional Evaluatives
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This paper presents one possible solution to theissue raised in Chung and Mascarenhas (2023), namely that the compositionalsemantics of Korean conditional evaluatives yields a modal semantics which isinsensitive to the probability of the modal prejacent. While Chung andMascarenhas’s semantics better captures people’s naive reasoning behaviorcompared to extant theories of modality, its complete ignorance to theprobability of the modal prejacent raises empirical concerns, particularly whenthe modal prejacent is extremely unlikely. In this paper, I point out that thisproblem arises from the assumption that the valuation of ‘If , then ’ involvesconditionalization on . I show that the problem can be avoided by takingconditionals to denote the degree to which the antecedent confirms theconsequent, as put forth in the evidential support theory of conditionals (Douven2008). I also discuss potential concerns arising from this fix in the deontic domain, and offer a solution by drawing insights from Stephen Finlay’s (2009)end-relationalism.
Abstract
This paper presents one possible solution to theissue raised in Chung and Mascarenhas (2023), namely that the compositionalsemantics of Korean conditional evaluatives yields a modal semantics which isinsensitive to the probability of the modal prejacent. While Chung andMascarenhas’s semantics better captures people’s naive reasoning behaviorcompared to extant theories of modality, its complete ignorance to theprobability of the modal prejacent raises empirical concerns, particularly whenthe modal prejacent is extremely unlikely. In this paper, I point out that thisproblem arises from the assumption that the valuation of ‘If , then ’ involvesconditionalization on . I show that the problem can be avoided by takingconditionals to denote the degree to which the antecedent confirms theconsequent, as put forth in the evidential support theory of conditionals (Douven2008). I also discuss potential concerns arising from this fix in the deontic domain, and offer a solution by drawing insights from Stephen Finlay’s (2009)end-relationalism.
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