한국기업의 지배구조와 부채 : 부채의 통제효과와 착취효과 검증
Debt and Corporate Governance : The Role of Debt as Disciplining or Expropriation Device in Korea
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초록
본 연구는 한국기업의 지배구조에서 부채가 규율수단으로 작동하는지 혹은 소수주주나 채권자의 이익을 착취하는 메커니즘으로 작동하는지를 검증하였다. 이를 위해 기업가치방정식과 레버리지방정식을 설정하고 3단계 최소자승법을 이용하여 분석하였다. 자료는 2000년부터 2008년 기간 중에 한국거래소 유가증권시장에 상장된 총 4,454개 기업이다. 분석결과를 보면, 첫째, 전체기업을 대상으로 분석한 결과에서 한국기업의 경우 부채의 규율효과가 존재하는 것으로 분석되었다. 그러나 재벌기업과 비재벌기업으로 나누어 분석한 결과에서 비재벌기업에서는 부채의 규율효과를 확인할 수 있었지만 재벌기업은 부채의 규율효과에 대한 증거를 발견할 수 없었다. 소유와 통제구조가 착취에 경도된 것으로 시장에서 평가받고 있는 재벌기업은 비재벌기업에 비해 규율효과가 상대적으로 약화되는 것으로 이해되었다. 둘째, 부채의 규율효과가 강하게 작용하는 저성장기업의 경우 재벌기업과 비재벌기업 모두에서 부채의 규율효과가 존재하는 것으로 분석되었다. 또한 대리인문제의 발생가능성이 높은 저성장 재벌기업에서 부채의 규율효과가 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 고성장기업의 경우에는 비재벌기업에서만 부채의 규율효과를 확인할 수 있었다. 셋째, 소유-지배괴리도라는 착취지표를 포함하여 부채의 규율효과와 착취효과를 분석한 결과에서, 재벌기업과 비재벌기업에서 여전히 규율효과가 지속되는 것으로 분석되었다. 그렇지만 재벌기업에서는 부채의 착취효과도 존재하는 것으로 평가되었다. 소유권과 지배권에 괴리도가 큰 재벌기업은 부채발행을 통해 지배권을 더욱 강화함으로써 소액주주의 이해를 착취하고자 하는 유인이 증가하는 것으로 이해할 수 있었다.
Abstract
We analyze the role of debt in corporate governance with respect to a large emerging economy,Korea, where debt has been an important source of external finance. Specifically, we analyzed whether debt acts as a discipling device in those firms where potential for overinvestment is present. In doing so we undertook a comparative evaluation for role of debt in Chaebol versus non-Chaebol firms to gain insights into the important issue of whether the governance role of debt is sensitive to ownership and control structure. Using cross-sectional data on total 4,454 korean listed companies, we estimate, simultaneously,the relation between corporate value and leverage for 9 years, from 2000 to 2008. Our analysis indicates that debt has disciplinary effect on non-Chaebol. But we can not find any evidence of disciplinary effect on Chaebol. We find limited evidence of debt being used as an expropriation mechanism in Chaebol firms that are more vulnerable to such expropriation. Chaebol firms have characteristics of the concentrated ownership and control. Inside shareholders (or promoters) have control rights that are often well in excess of their cash flow or ownership rights. We can interpret that such ownership structure enable inside shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders through the use of unfairly priced transactions to divert or tunnel resources.
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