Decision to End Economic Sanctions: Trade Sanction Types and Sender’s Withdrawal
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This research explores the duration of economic sanctions focusing on the domestic redistributional impacts of trade type sanctions on sender governments’ decision to withdraw. Trade sanctions are distinguished between export controls and import restrictions. This research hypothesizes that import restrictions can offer import-competing sectors economic rents and lead the sender governments to continue economic sanctions. Conversely, the use of export controls may incur economic losses for export-oriented industries and accelerate the sender governments’ decision to capitulate. Utilizing the Global Sanctions Data Base for empirical analysis, the study finds that export controls accelerate the termination of sanctions, whereas import restrictions have a less significant effect on prolonging them. This research expands the study of economic sanctions by exploring the sender countries’ rationale to continue or terminate economic sanctions. The findings emphasize that the domestic redistributional effects of sanctions play an important role in explaining the decision to end economic coercion.
Abstract
This research explores the duration of economic sanctions focusing on the domestic redistributional impacts of trade type sanctions on sender governments’ decision to withdraw. Trade sanctions are distinguished between export controls and import restrictions. This research hypothesizes that import restrictions can offer import-competing sectors economic rents and lead the sender governments to continue economic sanctions. Conversely, the use of export controls may incur economic losses for export-oriented industries and accelerate the sender governments’ decision to capitulate. Utilizing the Global Sanctions Data Base for empirical analysis, the study finds that export controls accelerate the termination of sanctions, whereas import restrictions have a less significant effect on prolonging them. This research expands the study of economic sanctions by exploring the sender countries’ rationale to continue or terminate economic sanctions. The findings emphasize that the domestic redistributional effects of sanctions play an important role in explaining the decision to end economic coercion.
참고문헌 (34)
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