Public Good Conflict with Symmetric Reimbursement
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For a key class of public goods, US federal regulations say that the loser should pay the winner’s legal fees in an environmental conflict. The fight is over the probability of winning prize that is a private good for a group of firms interested in development of the resource and a public good for a group of citizens interested in its preservation. We examine public-private environmental conflicts which involve a prize that is a private good for the firms but a public good for the citizen group. We explore the effort levels and efficiency consequences of the public-private environmental conflict. This paper shows that reimbursement rules cannot induce players to expend effort. Adding reimbursement into the public good contests reveals an interesting result—more effort level comes with greater social costs, but the symmetric rule fails to promote more public participation.
Abstract
For a key class of public goods, US federal regulations say that the loser should pay the winner’s legal fees in an environmental conflict. The fight is over the probability of winning prize that is a private good for a group of firms interested in development of the resource and a public good for a group of citizens interested in its preservation. We examine public-private environmental conflicts which involve a prize that is a private good for the firms but a public good for the citizen group. We explore the effort levels and efficiency consequences of the public-private environmental conflict. This paper shows that reimbursement rules cannot induce players to expend effort. Adding reimbursement into the public good contests reveals an interesting result—more effort level comes with greater social costs, but the symmetric rule fails to promote more public participation.
참고문헌 (8)
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