재정규모의 정치적 결정요인: 의회의 정치적 집중도
Political Determinants of the Size of Government Expenditure in the Political Rent-seeking Economy: The Political Concentration
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초록
이 논문은 정부 재정규모와 정치구조 특히, 의회의 정치적 집중도와의 관계를 분석한다. 경제적 렌트를 추구하는 로비 그룹과 당선가능성과 정치적 렌트를 동시에 고려하는 정치인의 상호작용에 의하여 정부지출 규모가 결정되는 정치경제 모델을 고려하였다. 렌트추구 경제(rent-seeking economy)에서는 정치구조가 압력단체의 정치적 렌트추구 행위에 영향을 미치고 렌트추구 행위는 정치인이 결정하는 정책변수인 재정규모에 영향을 미친다. 모델의 결론은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 의회의 정치적 집중도가 클수록 재정규모가 커진다. 둘째, 로비시장이 경쟁적일수록 재정규모가 증대한다. 실증분석에서는 우리나라 광역자치단체 의회의 정치적 집중도가 높을수록 광역자치단체의 재정적자율은 높아지는 경향이 있다는 것을 발견했다. 그리고 정치적 경기변동(politicalbusiness cycle)이 우리나라 지방재정에도 존재함을 확인하였다.
Abstract
This paper analyzes a relationship between the size of governmentexpenditure and political structure in the parliament. It considers a politicalrent-seeking economy in which the size of government expenditure isdetermined by the rent-seeking politicians and the lobbying groups of voters. The pressure groups seek economic rents to influence the choice of thepoliticians. According to the results of the model, the larger the politicalconcentration in the parliament or the more competitive the lobby-market forpolitical rents, the larger the equilibrium level of government expenditure. The empirical results confirms that the political concentration in the localparliament affects the size of local government expenditure.
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