Recent Developments of U.S. Executive Compensation System
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초록
2010년 7월 21일, 미국 오바마 대통령은 대공황 이후 가장 대대적인 개혁내용을 담은 도드-프랭크법에 서명함으로써 미국 금융관련법제의 큰 변화가 이루어졌다. 동법에서는 2008년 금융위기 이전부터 꾸준히 개혁논의가 진행되어 왔던 미국 상장기업 임원보수를 규제하기 위한 많은 규정들을 담고 있는데, 이는 현행 기업임원보수의 과다성에 대한 미국국민과 투자자들의 반감을 반영하는 것이기도 하다. 동법상 임원보수 관련규정들의 주된 취지는 보수결정에 있어 임원과 주주의 이해관계를 조정함으로써 임원의 업무성과에 상응하는 적정한 보수를 지급하자는데 있다. 여러 규정들 가운데 특징적인 조항은 보수위원회의 독립성 강화조항과 주주승인권제도의 도입이다. 이 논문에서는 현재 미국 상장기업 임원보수체계의 구조적 문제점을 살펴보고, 문제점을 개선하기 위한 미국 정부의 그간의 노력과정에 대해 고찰하고자 한다. 우선 제2절에서는 현행 미국임원보수체계의 내재적 문제점을 분석하고, 제3절에서는 미국 정부 및 증권위원회의 입법적 노력이 공시규칙의 최근 개정내용과 도드-프랭크법상의 주요 보수관련 규정들의 내용을 살펴 본 뒤 이러한 규정들의 보수제도 개선의 한계점에 대해 살펴보기로 한다.
Abstract
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama finally signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which is the most comprehensive reform to overhaul regulations of the financial industry since the Great Depression. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, a number of significant executive compensation provisions that will affect all public corporations in the U.S. are included. These measures attempt to address wide spread public outrage over excessive compensation of corporate executives. The main intention of these provisions is to better align executive’s and shareholder interests. Among others, the provisions to bolster the independence of compensation committees and the introduction on say-on-pay vote on executive compensation would have important impact in the future. In this article, I identified several problems inherent in current compensation structures of U.S. public corporations, and has also shown recent regulatory efforts for curbing excessiveness of executive compensation, the SEC disclosure rules and the enactment of Dodd-Frank Act. Firstly, I provided SEC disclosure rule changes toward more transparent disclosure to investors regarding corporate executives’ compensation plans. Through the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the disclosure requirements concerning executive compensation was more strengthened. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act includes other provisions to reform executive compensation system, which apply to both the financial company and public corporations as follows: compensation committee and risk committee rules, say-on-pay requirements, and restrictions on compensation structures. In summary, I do not believe that giving shareholders the power to influence executive compensation negotiations at each individual corporation will restrain the development of systemic risks like those preceding the 2007 credit crunch and subsequent recession. However, the Dodd-Frank’s shareholder say-on-pay provisions do represent an important step in limiting the corporate governance failures that may have contributed to the financial crisis. Shareholder’s ability to have an influence on executive compensation through say-on-pay will help prevent executives from seeking excessive compensation that rewards unnecessary risk-taking and emphasizes short-term performance.
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