집행임원제도하의 임원보수 규제방안－미국 경기부양법(Stimulus Bill)상의 임원보수 제한규정을 중심으로－

Abstract

In this article, I analyze the executive compensation provision (§ 408-2(3)(6)) under the proposed revised version of 2008 Korean Commercial Code, and demonstrate its shortcomings in order to effectively regulate the compensation for executive officers under the proposed executive officer system in Korea. I also introduce the U.S. regulations which has been recently promulgated as a part of TARP to prevent excessive payments to poorly performed executives in U.S. publicly-held corporations, such as EESA, ARRA, and CFA. Among these regulations, my article focuses on the compensation-related provisions under ARRA which is affecting most of the TARP recipients under the U.S. stimulus plan. According to the ARRA, corporations which received a significant taxpayer fund under the TARP, must observe stricter compensation policies mandated under the ARRA, such as prohibition of certain types of compensation -bonuses, retention awards, incentive compensation,golden parachutes and luxury expenditures-, improved compensation committee requirements,Say-on-Pay and compensation clawback. Among these requirements, Say-on-Pay policy has been considered most effective method to curtail excessive executive compensation practices. Specifically, in the wake of recent financial crisis and global economic crisis, the growing public criticism on the incessant upward trend of executive compensation demands more fundamental remedy to curb compensation problems. Recognizing that there are several systemic flaws in current compensation system, such as lack of linkage between compensation and performance,executive’s short-termism, and lack of director’s accountability to shareholders, shareholder activists as well as many politicians have suggested the adoption of Say-on-Pay policies. After a full discussion on the details of the executive compensation provision under the proposed revised version of 2008 Korean Commercial Code (§ 408-2(3)(6)), I recommend that the Korean Commercial Code implement more detailed executive compensation provisions regarding compensation setting process and the disclosure of each executive’s detailed payments, not the total amounts paid to all directors and executives. In addition,after adopting a executive officer system in Korea, the Code should also maintain current compensation approval system in which shareholders should approve the compensation plan for directors with binding effect. Without the approval by shareholders, we may confront the same compensation crisis like the U.S. and Eurpope. Finally, I stress in this article that well-established executive compensation system would function as a fundamental basis to improve our corporate governance structure.