본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

감리지적 기업의 경영자, 이사회 및 외부감사인 특성

Characteristics of Management, Governance Structure, and External Auditor of Firms Subject to Korean Securities & Futures Commission Enforcement

이상철|정갑수|박재완
한국공인회계사회 (THE KOREAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS)|2009.06|회계ㆍ세무와 감사 연구 (Study on Accounting, Taxation & Auditing)|제49호|pp. 163-203|DOI 10.22781/kicpa.2009..49.163

0

조회

0

다운로드

34

인용

0

참고문헌

키워드

이사회외부감사인감사위원회Board of DirectorsAudit CommitteeEnforcement경영자 특성External Audit회계부정Management Characteristics감리지적Accounting Fraud.
주제분류회계학

초록

본 연구에서는 감리지적 기업의 특성을 재무제표 작성 과정에서 회계정보의 품질과 직접적인 관련을 맺는 경영자, 감사위원회 및 이사회, 그리고 외부감사인 특성으로 구분한 다음, 감리에 지적되지 않은 기업과 대응시켜 특성의 차이를 비교하였다. 2000년부터 2005년까지 한국증권선물거래소 유가증권시장에 상장된 제조기업 가운데, 감리에 지적된 84개 기업을 선정하고, 선정된 감리지적기업과 동일한 연도, 산업에 속하고 자산규모가 비슷하며 유사한 수준의 감사서비스를 제공하는 외부감사인에게 감사를 받아 감리에 지적되지 않은 84개 기업-연 자료를 통제표본으로 선정하였다. 모두 168개 기업-연 자료를 최종적인 표본으로 선정하여 분석을 실시하였다. 주요 연구결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 경영자 특성 가운데 소유경영자인 경우에는 감리에 지적될 가능성이 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 그러나 대규모 기업집단에 소속된 기업의 경영자인 경우 감리에 지적될 가능성이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 이사회 특성에서, 이사회의 사외이사 수가 증가할수록 감리에 지적될 가능성이 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 감리지적 기업의 경영자, 이사회 및 외부감사인 특성을 파악한 연구결과는 회계정책 당국이 회계정보의 신뢰성을 향상시킬 수 있는 제도적 방안을 마련하는데 도움을 줄 수 있을 것이다. 또한 감리지적 기업의 특성을 파악하여 감리대상 기업 선정에 활용함으로써, 감리업무를 효율적으로 수행하는데도 공헌할 수 있을 것이다.

Abstract

The reliability of financial statements may be influenced by management, corporate governance structure and external audit quality. Management is responsible for fairly preparing financial statements according to GAAP. Corporate governance structure plays an important role in internally monitoring management's financial reporting process. Independent external auditors attest to whether financial statements include material misstatements. In this paper, we investigate characteristics of firms subject to Korean Securities & Futures Commission (KSFC) enforcement (hereafter, fraud firms), compared with those which are not subject to KSFC enforcement. We focus on characteristics of management, board of directors including the audit committee, and external auditor. We identify firms subject to KSFC enforcement disclosed on the internet site of KSFC form the year 2000 to 2005. Using sample selection criteria such as non-financing firms and data availability, we obtain 84 fraud firm-year data. To use the matched-pairs analysis, each fraud firm was matched with a non-fraud firm on the basis of firm size, industry code, and external auditor quality criteria. Our final samples consist of 168 firm-year data (84 fraud firm-year data and 84 matched non-fraud firm-year data). Using logistic regression models, we investigate the differences in characteristics of management, corporate governance system and external auditors between fraud firms and matched non-fraud firms. In our models, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether each observation is a fraud firm or not. Independent variables include characteristics of management, corporate governance structure including audit committee, and external auditor. Based on the agency theory, we investigate four characteristics of management (owner-manager dummy, existence of stock option-based compensation plan, whether or not firms belong to the largest 30 Korean company groups, and top management tenure). Characteristics of corporate governance structure include independence of board of directors, outsider director's average tenure, outside directors' activities, the number of outsider directors, and the existence of the audit committee. We also include characteristics of external auditor such as first-year audit dummy, auditor tenure and type of audit opinion. Control variables such as firm size, financial status variables, operating performance variables are selected and included in our models on the basis of prior research results. Our main findings are as follows: Firstly, consistent with the agency theory expectation, we find that owner-controller firms are less likely to be subject to KSFC enforcement. This result implies that professional management controlled firms have incentives to misstate financial reports, which may lead to KSFC enforcement. We also find that firms which belong to the largest 30 Korean company groups are more likely to be subject to KSFC enforcement. This result can be interpreted as existence of agency problems between majority ruling shareholders and minority shareholders. Firms which belong to the largest 30 Korean company groups may be governed by majority ruling shareholders who want to maximize their own utilities at the expense of minority shareholders, which may reduce the quality of financial reporting. The independent variable representing existence of stock option-based compensation plan has a significant negative association with KSFC enforcement in our integrated model. However, our additional sensitivity analysis shows that relationship between existence of stock option-based compensation plan and KSFC enforcement is statistically unstable, which may be caused by limited data size or multi-collinearity problem. Secondly, among characteristics of corporate governance structure considered in the paper, only the size of outside independent directors within board of directors is associated with lower probability of being subject to KSFC enforcement. The other corporate governance variables have no significant associations with KSFC enforcement. Lastly, among characteristics of external auditors, type of audit opinion is negatively associated with KSFC enforcement in our integrated model. However, the association between those two variables shows no consistent results in our additional analysis. Our study expands previous literature investigating characteristics of firms subject to KSFC enforcement in terms of the following two aspects. One is that this paper identifies three group of stakeholders (management, board of directors and external auditor) who may affect reliable financial reporting process and systematically investigates characteristics of firms involved in fraudulent reporting. The other is that while previous Korean literature focuses on financial characteristics of fraud firms, this study includes characteristics of management who has a direct responsibility for reliable financial reporting, and this paper finds that agency problems both between owners and managements and between majority shareholders and minority shareholders can result in fraudulent financial reporting. Our findings can help regulators such as KSFC in selecting sample firms to examine whether those firms and their external auditors are involved in fraudulent financial reporting.

참고문헌 (74)

  1. 고대영, "감사위원회 도입과 감사위원회의 독립성이 이익조정 통제에 미치는 영향", 회계와 감사 연구, (45), pp.69~90 (2007), 한국공인회계사회
  2. 김정애, "기업지배구조가 회계부정에 미치는 영향", 회계와 감사 연구, (45), pp.297~324 (2007), 한국공인회계사회
  3. 박종성, "피감사회사 특성과 감사인 특성을 이용한 감리지적 예측", 박사, pp.1998
  4. 박종성, "피감사회사 특성과 감사인 특성을 이용한 감리지적 예측", 회계학연구, 24(1), pp.1~32 (1999)
  5. 박종일, "기업지배구조와 이익조정: 최대주주 지분율을 중심으로", 회계학연구, 28(2), pp.135~172 (2003), 한국회계학회
  6. 손성규, "감리지적의 현황과 정보효과", 회계학연구, 23(2), pp.107~131 (1998)
  7. 신현한, "최고경영자의 교체에 따른 경영성과 변화", 재무연구, 16(2), pp.231~256 (2003), 한국재무학회
  8. 신현한, "최고경영자에 대한 감사지 역할의 변화: 아시아 금융위기를 전후로 한 비교", 전략경영연구, 7(2), pp.1~26 (2004), 한국전략경영학회
  9. 이원창, "감사인 특성에 따른 감사품질의 차이에 관한 연구", 회계학연구, 9, pp.259~285 (1989)
  10. 임영덕, "계속 감사기간과 감사품질에 관한 연구", 회계학연구, 31(3), pp.183~214 (2006), 한국회계학회
  11. 전성빈, "최고경영자 교체 빈도와 이익의 질", 회계와 감사 연구, (45), pp.91~118 (2007), 한국공인회계사회
  12. 정석우, "감리결과의 분석과 회계감사의 품질", 한국회계학회 1998년 하계학술 연구발표회 발표논문집, pp.395~416 (1998)
  13. 정태범, "회계법인 강제교체제도에 대한 검토", 세무와회계저널, 9(3), pp.313~342 (2008), 한국세무학회
  14. 최 관, "감리지적기업의 이익조작에 관한 실증적 연구", 회계학연구, 23(2), pp.133~161 (1998)
  15. 금융감독원 감리선정 모형 개발, "최 관", 금융감독원, ~ (2001)
  16. 최관, "회계부정기업의 특성에 관한 연구: 감리지적기업을 중심으로", 회계학연구, 28(2), pp.211~243 (2003), 한국회계학회
  17. 최관, "이사회 및 감사위원회의 특성과 회계부정 간의 관계에 관한 실증분석", 회계와 감사 연구, (48), pp.351~389 (2008), 한국공인회계사회
  18. Baysinger, B. D, "Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors： Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 101~124 (1985)
  19. Beasley, M, "An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Directors Composition and Financial Statement Fraud", The Accounting Review, 71, pp.443~465 (1996)
  20. Beasley, M., "Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997 An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies", SEC Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, ~ (1999)
  21. Beatty, R, "Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings", The Accounting Review, 64, pp.693~709 (1989)
  22. Becker, C., "The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management", Contemporary Accounting Research, 15, pp.1~24 (1998)
  23. The Dectection of Earnings Manipulation, "Beneish, M", Duke University, ~ (1994)
  24. Beneish, M, "Detecting GAAP Violation: Implication for Assessing Earnings Management among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance", Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 16, pp.271~309 (1997)
  25. Beneish, M, "Incentives and Penalties Related to Earnings Overstatements that Violate GAAP", The Accounting Review, 74, pp.425~457 (1999)
  26. Bergstresser, D, "CEO Incentives and Earnings Management", Journal of Financial Economics, 80, pp.511~529 (2006)
  27. Do Independent Directors Matter, "Bhagat, S", ~ (1977)
  28. Bonner, S., "Fraud Type and Auditor Litigation: An Analysis of SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases", The Accounting Review, 73(4), pp.503~532 (1998)
  29. Bowen, R., "Stakeholders' Implicit Claims and Accounting Method Choice", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, pp.255~295 (1995)
  30. Do Executive Stock Options Generate Incentives for Earnings Management?, "Burns, N", Evidence from Accounting Restatements, ~ (2003)
  31. Carcello, J. V, "Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting", Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, pp.55~69 (2004)
  32. The Relation ship of Audit Failures and Audit Tenure, "Casterella, J.", University of Florida, ~ (2004)
  33. Claessens, S., "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings", The Journal of Finance, 57(6), pp.2741~2772 (2002)
  34. Core, J. E, "The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 28, pp.151~184 (1999)
  35. Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, "Findings and Recommendations Part 2: Corporate Governance, Part 3: Audit and Accounting", The Conference Board (2003)
  36. Craswell, A., "Auditor Brand Name Reputations and Industry Specializations", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, pp.297~322 (1995)
  37. Dechow, P, "Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14, pp.51~89 (1991)
  38. Dechow, P., "Detecting Earnings Management", The Accounting Review, 70, pp.193~225 (1995)
  39. Dechow, P., "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Management: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC", Contemporary Accounting Research, 13, pp.1~36 (1996)
  40. Dechow, P, "Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators", Accounting Horizons, 14, pp.235~250 (2000)
  41. DeFond, M, "Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23, pp.115~139 (1997)
  42. Feroz, E., "The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases", Journal of Accounting Research, 29, pp.107~142 (1991)
  43. Francis, J, "Auditor Changes: A Joint Test of Theories Relating to Agency Costs and Auditor Differentiation", The Accounting Review, 63, pp.663~682 (1998)
  44. Fudenberg, D, "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents", Journal of Political Economy, 103, pp.75~93 (1995)
  45. Haugen, R, "Resolving the Agency Problems of External Capital through Options", Journal of Finance, 36, pp.629~648 (1981)
  46. Haw, I., "Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions", Journal of Accounting Research, 42, pp.423~462 (2004)
  47. Healy, P, "The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, pp.85~107 (1985)
  48. Healy, P, "A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting", Accounting Horizons, 13, pp.365~383 (1999)
  49. Healy, P, "Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, pp.405~440 (2001)
  50. Hermalin, B, "The Effect of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance", Financial Management, 101~112 (1991)
  51. Hermalin, B, "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO", American Economic Review, 96~118 (1998)
  52. Hirshleifer, D, "Risk, Managerial Effort and Project Choice", Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2, pp.308~345 (1992)
  53. Holthausen, R., "Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19, pp.29~74 (1995)
  54. Jensen, M, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp.305~360 (1976)
  55. Johnson, S., "Tunneling", American Economic Review, 90(2), pp.22~27 (2000)
  56. Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud, "Johnson, S.", ~ (2005)
  57. Kim, J, "Ownership Structure, Business Group Affiliation, Listing Status, and Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea", Contemporary Accounting Research, 23(2), pp.427~464 (2006)
  58. Klein, A, "Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, pp.375~400 (2002)
  59. Klein, A, "Economic Determinants of Audit Committee Independence", The Accounting Review, 77, pp.435~452 (2002)
  60. Krishnan, J, "Litigation Risk and Auditor Resignations", The Accounting Review, 72, pp.539~560 (1997)
  61. Lys, T, "Lawsuit against Auditors", Journal of Accounting Research, 32, pp.65~93 (1994)
  62. Menon, K, "The Use of Audit Committees for Monitoring", Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 13, pp.121~139 (1994)
  63. Palmrose, Z, "Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence", Journal of Accounting Research, 24, pp.97~110 (1986)
  64. Palmrose, Z., "Determinants of Market Reactions to Restatement Announcements", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, pp.59~89 (2004)
  65. Ryan, S., "Commentary. 2001. SEC Auditor Independence Requirements: AAA Financial Accounting Standards Committee", Accounting Horizons, 373~386 (2001)
  66. Rosenstein, S, "Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth", Journal of Financial Economics, 175~191 (1990)
  67. Shockley, R, "A Behavioral Investigation of Supplier Differentiation in the Market for Audit Services", Journal of Accounting Research, 21, pp.545~564 (1983)
  68. Silvers, D, "Comment Letter on the SEC's Proposed Rules on Auditor Independence (File No. S7-49-02)", ~ (2003)
  69. Smith, C, "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 4, pp.391~405 (1985)
  70. St. Pierre, K, "An Analysis of Factors Associated with Lawsuits against Public Accountants", The Accounting Review, pp.242~263
  71. Summers, S, "Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements and Insider Trading: An Empirical Analysis", The Accounting Review, 73, pp.131~146 (1998)
  72. Teshima, N, "Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Japan", Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 19(2), pp.107~132 (2008)
  73. Warfield, T., "Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices, and Informativeness of Earning", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, pp.61~91 (1995)
  74. Yermack, D, "Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors", Journal of Financial Economics, 449~476 (1996)

관련 논문AI추천

외부감사인의 특성이 감리지적에 미치는 영향김경옥, 김정교한국국제회계학회 · 국제회계연구2015 · 제60호감리지적기업의 재무적 특성에 관한 연구이장순한국국제회계학회 · 국제회계연구2013 · 제48호이사회 및 감사위원회의 특성과 회계부정 간의 관계에 관한 실증분석최관, 박종일, 조현우한국공인회계사회 · 회계ㆍ세무와 감사 연구2008 · 제48호회계감리가 기업의 이익조정에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구김지홍, 서영미, 유정민한국공인회계사회 · 회계ㆍ세무와 감사 연구2012 · 제54권 제2호감사위원회 품질 및 특성과 외부감사인 사이의 관련성윤종철, 이상철한국국제회계학회 · 국제회계연구2017 · 제72호지배구조개선과 감사보수에 관한 관련성 연구 -사외이사의 특성, 지분소유구조, 감사위원회 중심으로-류호영, 이장희한국기업경영학회 · 기업경영연구2011 · 제18권 제1호

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (10건)

감사인의 내부회계관리제도 구축과 관련한 비감사 서비스 제공과 감사품질 사이의 관계최종학, 조희도, 최연식pp. 1-42지급보증이 감사보수 및 감사시간에 미치는 영향우용상, 이호영pp. 43-74지배회사와 연결대상 종속회사의 회계정책 일치화 실태조사오명전, 손성규, 김성환pp. 75-104경제위기 이후 대기업의 연구개발투자에 대한 조세지원제도의 효과 분석안숙찬pp. 105-135합병과 주식취득에 의한 완전지배의 조세효과 비교를 통한 기업구조조정세제의 문제점과 개선방안이준규pp. 137-161
원문 보기