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기업의 이익투명성이 조세회피 수준에 미치는 영향

Earnings Transparency and Tax Avoidance

김새로나|유현수|최규담
한국공인회계사회 (THE KOREAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS)|2017.09|회계ㆍ세무와 감사 연구 (Study on Accounting, Taxation & Auditing)|제59권 제3호|pp. 165-212|DOI 10.22781/kicpa.2017.59.3.165

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기업집단조세회피Chaebol회계투명성tax avoidance이익투명성accounting transparency사외이사비율earnings transparencythe ratio of outside directors in the Board
주제분류회계학

초록

본 연구는 투명성이 경영자에 대한 감독･통제라는 기업지배구조 역할을 수행한다는 선행연구에 근거하여(Bushman and Smith 2001, Healy and Palepu 2001, 박주영 2016), 이익(회계)투명성이 사익 추구를 목적으로 한 대리인 관점의 조세회피 활동과 어떤 관련성을 가지는지에 대한 실증적 연구이다. 이익과 같은 회계정보가 기업지배구조의 영향을 받아 생산되는 산출물이기도 하지만 동시에 기업지배구조의 역할도 수행한다(Bushman and Smith 2001). 따라서 이익(회계)투명성이 높은 경우, 일반적으로 경영자에 대한 통제 및 감시 역할을 하여 대리인 관점의 조세회피 활동을 억제하는지에 대하여 실증적으로 검토하였다. 또한, 경영자 통제장치인 우리나라 고유의 특성인 기업집단 여부와 이사회 내 사외이사 비율이 그러한 관계에 어떤 역할을 하는지에 대하여도 분석하였다. 2003년부터 2014년까지 한국증권거래소에 상장되어 있는 12월 결산법인(금융업 제외)을 대상으로 분석을 실시한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 이익(회계)투명성과 조세회피간의 관련성을 분석한 결과, 이익투명성이 낮을수록 조세회피 수준이 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 기업집단 소속여부를 고려하여 이익(회계)투명성이 조세회피 성향에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과, 이익투명성이 낮을수록 조세회피에 미치는 부정적 효과가 기업집단에 속하는 회사는 그렇지 않은 기업에 비해 완화되는 것을 발견하였다. 셋째, 이사회 내 사외이사 비중이 높을수록 경영자의 감독 역할의 강화로 기업의 조세회피 수준이 감소한다는 것을 확인하였다. 본 연구는 기업의 이익(회계)투명성이 증가할 때 경영자의 사익추구를 목적으로 한 공격적 조세정책을 억제한다는 점을 실증적으로 제시함으로써, 이익(회계)투명성이 낮은 기업 경영환경에서는 경영자가 기업의 장기적 발전을 위한 의사결정을 하도록 통제하는 장치가 중요할 수 있다는 시사점을 제공한다. 특히, 이러한 경영자 감시 및 통제장치로 대규모기업집단 소속여부 및 이사회 내 사외이사비율이 조세정책에 영향을 미칠 수 있다는 점을 실증적으로 제시하여 조세회피에 영향을 미치는 요소에 대한 이해의 폭을 넓히고자 하였다.

Abstract

In November 2015, OECD and G20 countries adopted the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project to tackle any tax avoidance by multinational enterprises(MNEs), which is composed of 15 Action Plans. Main purpose of BEPS project is establishing a new international tax framework under which profits are fairly taxed where economic activity and value creation occur. In particular, the BEPS Action 13 requires MNEs to report annually and for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business the adequate information required for enhancing the transparency for tax administrations (e.g., revenues, profit, the number of employee, assets). This information would be used for the relevant country to assess high-level transfer pricing and other BEPS-related risks. Background of this Action is that if the transparency in mutinational transactions is enhanced, it would be reduced for MNEs to take tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity. In this regard, we investigate whether earnings transparency as one of key accounting information could play also a certain role in monitoring or controlling the management’s tax avoidance activities. Bushman and Smith (2001) proposed that publicly reported financial accounting information is more comprehensively used in additional corporate control mechanisms even though financial accounting information is product of corporate accounting and governance systems. They focused on the role of the information provided by financial accounting systems in mitigating agency problems due to the separation of managers and outside investors. Meanwhile, if higher transparency in earnings explains a change in the firm value effectively, this can be the evidence of information usefulness and contribute to the efficient allocation of economic resources. Accordingly, we expect that it would be not easy for the managers to design more complex transactions to expand tax avoidance or personally appropriate the profit derived from such tax avoidance because higher earnings transparency could also alleviate the information asymmetry between managers and external market participants, and reduce agency costs through the supervising and controlling function. In this case, a firm with higher earnings transparency shows comparatively lower level of tax avoidance. Thus, we hypothesize that if a firm’s earnings transparency is higher, then the level of tax avoidance would be reduced(Hypothesis I). Next, we investigate how the relation between earnings transparency and the level of tax avoidance varies with a Korean specific governance mechanisms and independency of the board. Stronger external monitoring and controlling could constrain the managers’ aggressive planning for tax avoidance or private appropriation of the profits therefrom. A stronger independent board could also reduce the likelihood of such activities. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the negative (-) relation between earnings transparency and the level of tax avoidance will be more pronounced for the firms which belong to Chaebol group (Hypothesis II) and which has a stronger independent board (i.e., higher ratio of the number of outside directors out of total number of the board members)(Hypothesis III). To test such hypothesis, we measured tax avoidance by means of (i) Book ETR (iI) Cash ETR, (iii) the total BTD, (iv) abnormal BTD suggested by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) (DD_BTD) in order to reduce the measurement error. Further, method suggested by Barth et al. (2003) was employed for the measurement of earnings transparency. We find from the test of Hypothesis 1 that four (4) measures of tax avoidance level have negative (-) associations with earnings transparency at 1% to 10% confidence level, which indicates that any firm with higher earnings transparency is less likely to take aggressive tax avoidance because the earnings transparency plays the role of controlling and monitoring the management. This result implies that, for the firm with higher earnings transparency, the impact of earnings transparency on reputation risk and other non-tax costs would be much stronger than the decreased concern about information risk by the external investors. From test of Hypothesis 2, we also find that the negative (-) association between a firm’s earnings transparency and the level of tax avoidance is much more pronounced for the firms belonging to Chaebol group, meaning that the role of Chaebol is monitoring and controlling the management and preventing the managers to conduct aggressive tax avoidance. Test of Hypothesis 3 indicates that such negative (-) association is also more pronounced for the firms with higher board independency, suggesting that a firm having more independent board has increased oversight and the diverse set of view-points, promoted by a more independent board and its managers are prohibited from conducting aggressive tax avoidance. This research has a great significance in that its findings are implying that earning transparency based on a firm specific accounting information could be used as the means to prevent any aggressive tax avoidance, which is consistent with BEPS project at the high level. Our study is distinct from the prior tax literature in several ways: first, this study is for the Korean firms which are affected by the Korean specific governance system (i.e., Chaebol) whose role is controlling and monitoring the management. We separate Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms at the same level of earnings transparency, and we found that the level of tax avoidance of Chaebol firms is lower than that of non-Chaebol firms. Second, we conducted a robust test with the method suggested by Lang et al.(2012) for measuring earnings transparency, which includes the factor of accounting system and environment in addition to a specific firm’s accounting information, and found that the result is maintained in consistent with those of Barth et al.(2003). However, there may have existed the limitation due to some inevitable measurement errors in measuring tax avoidance and earnings transparency.

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