계속감사기간과 고객기업 투자효율성 사이의 비선형 관계
Nonlinear relationship between auditor tenure and client investment efficiency
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초록
고품질의 회계감사는 회계정보에 신뢰성을 부여하고 경영자를 감시하는 역할을 한다. 비교적 최근의 회계감사 연구흐름은 재무제표 감사라는 감사인 본연의 역할 뿐 아니라 회계전문가로서 감사인이 기업의 의사결정에 다각적 도움을 줄 수 있다고 본다. 예를 들어, 선행연구는 회계감사가 기업의 영업활동 뿐 아니라 재무와 투자활동에도 직간접적 도움을 준다고 주장한다. 다만 아직까지 계속감사기간의 측면에서 이를 살펴본 연구는 많지 않다. 이에 본 연구는 선행연구를 확장하여 계속감사기간과 고객기업 투자효율성의 관계를 탐색한다. 실증분석 결과 계속감사기간이 길어짐에 따라 비효율적 투자는 점차 증가하다가 이후 다시 감소하였다. 즉, 계속감사기간과 비효율적 투자(투자효율성)는 역U자형(U자형) 관계가 관찰되었다. 구체적으로, 비효율적 투자는 분석방법에 따라 계속감사기간이 약 5.25∼6.25년일 때 최대값을 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 계속감사기간이 길어짐에 따라 비효율적 투자 수준이 점차 증가하다가 약 6년 정도가 경과한 이후부터는 다시 비효율적 투자가 점차 감소하는 경향이 있음을 의미한다. 이러한 결과는 non-Big4 표본, 과잉투자 표본 및 저품질 회계정보 표본에서 유도되었다. 이는 계속감사기간과 고객기업 투자효율성의 관계는 고객기업과 감사인의 특성에 따라 상이할 수 있음을 시사한다. 마지막으로, 감사인 강제교체 기간을 제외한 결과와 국제회계기준 도입 이후 기간만을 이용한 결과 역시 전술한 결과와 질적으로 유사하였다. 본 연구는 학계와 실무에 다음과 같은 공헌을 한다. 첫째, 투자효율성과 계속감사기간 사이의 U자형 관계를 발견하여 계속감사기간의 효과가 항상 선형으로 나타나지는 않음을 실증하였다. 둘째, 국내외의 감사제도는 점차 감사인의 자율선임에 제약을 두려는 움직임이 있다. 국내에서도 과거 감사인 강제교체를 도입했던 바 있으며, 최근에는 주기적 감사인 지정제 등의 도입으로 감사인 교체가 빈번해질 가능성이 높아졌다. 본 연구의 결과는 일정기간 이상의 감사기간은 고객기업의 투자효율성을 제고하는데 도움을 줄 수 있음을 시사한다.
Abstract
This study investigates the association between auditor-client relationship and client firm investment efficiency. Traditional auditing research documents that high quality audit service provides credibility to accounting information and monitors management. Moreover, recent research flow argues that auditors not only conduct the auditing role of financial statement, but also can help clients’ various decisions as accounting experts. For instance, studies show that auditors help clients’ decisions on financial or investment activities. This would be done by communicating with client firms through long auditor-client relationships. Nevertheless, only a few have been examined the effect of auditor-client relationships on those activities. Most of prior studies have focused on the quality of accounting information when investigating the effects of the auditor tenure, and there are two contradictory views. On the one hand, results from previous studies show that longer tenure enhances accounting quality as auditors’ knowledge of client firm is an increasing function of tenure. On the other hand, papers argue that auditor independence is impaired by longer tenure thereby harms accounting quality. By focusing on the different perspectives of auditor tenure, this study tests the effect of tenure on investment efficiency. Using Korean listed firms, current study finds that the relationship between auditor tenure and client investment efficiency is non-linear. Specifically, current study documents that the investment inefficiency increases as tenure increases, however, it then decreases when the tenure is longer than 6.25 years. Thus, it shows (inverse) U-shape between tenure and investment efficiency (inefficiency). The specific years of tenure that maximize investment inefficiency are between 5.25 and 6.25 years, depending on the different proxies of investment efficiency and observations used in each test. Furthermore, the relationship is derived by over-investment sub-sample, non-Big4 sub-sample, and low accounting quality sub-sample. Lastly, the results excluding the mandatory auditor rotation period and the results using only the period after the introduction of K-IFRS are also qualitatively similar. Current study contributes to existing literature and practice in the following ways. First, since both concern on the impairment of auditor independence and the argument on accumulating auditor expertise on client and industry caused by longer auditor tenure exist in prior literature, it extends the effect of the continuous auditor tenure by showing its significant impact on client investment efficiency. Second, by discovering the U-shaped relationship between investment efficiency and the auditor tenure, the results of this paper document that the effect of tenure does not always appear linearly. Finally, domestic auditing regulations are increasingly trying to limit clients’ decision to voluntarily appoint external auditors. In Korea, the possibility of frequent replacement of auditors has increased with the introduction of a periodic auditor designation regulation. The results of this study imply that maintaining certain years of auditor tenure can help improving the investment efficiency of client firms. Followings are the caveats of our study. First, because the investment efficiency cannot be observed, we use estimated proxy in our analyses. Therein, our results may suffer from the bias embedded in the estimator. Second, even though we considered auditor characteristic using dichotomous variable that divides sample into big4 and non-big4 auditors, this does not guarantee that all individual audit firm characteristics are controlled in our model. Thus, we are cautious to extend our results to other client firm outcomes.
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