공시수준에 따른 조세회피의 차별적 시장반응
Differentiated Market Responses to Tax Avoidance According to Disclosure Level
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초록
조세회피 관련 연구들은 조세회피의 효과에 대한 양면성을 보고하고 있으며, 최근에는 경영자가 조세회피를 통해 사적 이익을 추구한다는 부정적인 결과가 주류를 이루고 있다. 경영자가 조세회피를 사적 용도로 사용한다는 부정적인 관점의 전제는 대리인 문제에서 출발한다. 즉, 대리인인 경영자가 자신의 이익 극대화를 위한 의사결정을 함으로써 조세회피로 인해 확보된 현금을 사적 이익추구에 사용한다고 가정하는 것이다. 그러나 대리인이 이기적인 존재가 아니라 이타적인 존재라면 이러한 가정은 성립하지 않는다. “과연 그렇다면 시장에는 이기적인 경영자만 존재하는 것일까? 이타적인 경영자라면 이 상황에서 어떠한 행동을 할 것인가?”라는 질문에서 본 연구는 출발하였다. 대리인 문제의 출발은 정보 불균형이므로 이타적인 경영자라면 정보 불균형을 완화하기 위해 노력할 것이고, 기업이 정보를 제공하는 수단인 ‘공시’를 활용할 가능성이 크다. 그러나 공시수준이 높은 기업의 조세회피가 순기능적인 측면에서의 조세회피라고 단정 지을 수 없으므로 본 연구에서는 공시수준이 낮은 기업의 조세회피와 공시수준이 높은 기업의 조세회피에 대한 시장반응의 차이를 분석하고자 한다. 분석결과 공시수준이 높은 기업의 조세회피에 대한 이익반응계수가 그렇지 않은 기업에 비해 상대적으로 높게 나타났다. 조세회피 측정치를 달리한 분석에서도 동일한 결과가 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 공시수준이 높은 기업의 조세회피는 기업가치 증대의 목적일 가능성이 크다는 것을 간접적으로 증명할 수 있는 결과라 할 수 있다. 본 연구는 정보 이용자와 경영자 간의 정보 불균형이 조세회피에 대한 상이한 판단을 유발하는 원인 중 하나가 될 수 있음을 제시한다. 또한, 시장은 경영자의 자율공시행위를 정보 비대칭을 감소시키는 긍정적인 행위로 평가한다고 볼 수 있으므로, 경영자가 자율공시제도를 더욱 유의미한 소통수단으로 활용할 수 있음을 시사한다.
Abstract
Studies on corporate tax avoidance report two sides to the effect of tax avoidance. In particular, the results of managers' pursuit of private interests through tax avoidance have been the main trend in recent years. Tax avoidance should be subject to regulation if it is reduced to a tool for managers to pursue private interests, but if it is used as a positive functional aspect of increasing corporate value, it should be encouraged. Thus, the purpose of this study was to identify the intention of tax avoidance by a company. The direct intention was unknown, so an indirect method was used. The premise that companies use tax evasion for their private use starts with the agency problem. In other words, it is assumed that an agent, the manager, uses the cash secured from tax evasion to pursue private interests by making decisions to maximize his profits. However, this assumption does not exist if the agent is not selfish but altruistic. In other words, it is assumed that an agent, the manager, uses the cash secured from tax evasion to pursue private interests by making decisions to maximize his profits. However, this assumption does not valid if the agent is not selfish but altruistic. If so, are there only selfish managers in the market? What would an altruistic manager do in this situation?" The study in this question starts. The start of the agent problem is information imbalance. An altruistic manager will actively strive to ease information asymmetry. It is highly likely that companies will actively utilize 'disclosure' as a means of providing information. Therefore, it can be inferred that the objective of tax avoidance is likely to be to increase the value of the corporate in a relatively higher disclosure ratio. However, it is not certain that tax avoidance by an entity with a high level of disclosure is tax avoidance which has a more positive function. Thus, in this study, we analyzed the differences in market responses to tax avoidance by corporates with lower disclosure levels and those with higher disclosure levels. The analysis results showed that companies with higher disclosure levels had a relatively higher earnings response coefficient for tax evasion than those with lower disclosure levels. The same results were found in analyses using different tax avoidance measurements. These results can be indirectly demonstrated that tax avoidance by entities with high disclosure levels is likely to be the objective of increasing corporate value. This study suggests that information asymmetry between information users and managers can be one of the causes of different judgments about tax avoidance. Also, the market may evaluate the voluntary disclosure of managers as a positive act that reduces information asymmetry. Therefore, it suggests that managers can use the voluntary disclosure system as a more meaningful means of communication.
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