동일인 지정제도와 자기주식의 취득, 보유 및 처분 : 정성적 기준을 중심으로
The Same Person Designation System and the Acquisition, Holding, and Disposal of Treasury Stock: The Qualitative-Criteria Based Analysis
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Even if a person in a corporate group in Korea is not designated as ‘the same person’ according to the quantitative criteria, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) may designate the same person based on the qualitative criteria concerning ‘treasury stock.’ Since many corporate groups in Korea have acquired and held treasury stock, this issue is crucial in relation to the designation of the same person. Still, there is hardly any detailed explanation by the regulatory agency (KFTC) or discussion in the Fair-Trade-Law related practice circles and academia. Treasury stock can be abused as a tool to defend a controlling shareholder’s control over a corporate group. On the other hand, it should be noted that treasury stock is one of a few takeover defense devices allowed under the Korean legal system. Treasury stock also has its corporate finance functions, such as returning the company's free cash flows to the shareholders. In addition, when applying the qualitative criteria for designation of the same person, the KFTC should distinguish between the situation in which treasury shares have been ‘already’ transferred to a friendly third party, and the situation where there is merely a ‘possibility’ of being transferred but not currently transferred. Since treasury stock is a common phenomenon in the corporate world and the capital market, various discussions on the acquisition, holding, and disposal of treasury stock are expected in the near future with respect to the same person designation system and related regulations. The Author hopes that this paper will contribute to establishing more specific and systematic guidelines for the KFTC regarding treasury stock when designating the same person.
Abstract
Even if a person in a corporate group in Korea is not designated as ‘the same person’ according to the quantitative criteria, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) may designate the same person based on the qualitative criteria concerning ‘treasury stock.’ Since many corporate groups in Korea have acquired and held treasury stock, this issue is crucial in relation to the designation of the same person. Still, there is hardly any detailed explanation by the regulatory agency (KFTC) or discussion in the Fair-Trade-Law related practice circles and academia. Treasury stock can be abused as a tool to defend a controlling shareholder’s control over a corporate group. On the other hand, it should be noted that treasury stock is one of a few takeover defense devices allowed under the Korean legal system. Treasury stock also has its corporate finance functions, such as returning the company's free cash flows to the shareholders. In addition, when applying the qualitative criteria for designation of the same person, the KFTC should distinguish between the situation in which treasury shares have been ‘already’ transferred to a friendly third party, and the situation where there is merely a ‘possibility’ of being transferred but not currently transferred. Since treasury stock is a common phenomenon in the corporate world and the capital market, various discussions on the acquisition, holding, and disposal of treasury stock are expected in the near future with respect to the same person designation system and related regulations. The Author hopes that this paper will contribute to establishing more specific and systematic guidelines for the KFTC regarding treasury stock when designating the same person.
참고문헌 (33)
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