온라인 플랫폼 사업자의 자사우대에 대한경쟁법상 허용 범위의 한계 - 네이버쇼핑 사건과 EU Google Shopping 사건, 영국 Streetmap 사건을 중심으로 -
The Limits of Self-Preferencing in Digital Market under Competition Regime: A Comparative Law Perspective
0
조회
0
다운로드
13
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
“Self-preferencing” by vertically-integrated online platforms(“VOPs”) currently comes under fierce scrutiny by competition authorities around the world. In a digital ecosystem, these VOPs assume a dual role both as a “rule maker” with their power to design search algorithms and at the same time as a “player” in downstream markets. While VOPs’ incentive for favorable treatment of their own goods/services over competitors is arguably an inherent element in platform businesses, their rulemaking power would certainly not be without limitation under competition law regimes. The KFTC’s recent Naver Shopping decision on self-preferencing left the Korean antitrust community with more questions than answers in at least three aspects. In the first place, statutory interpretation on whether Naver Shopping’s favoring of its affiliate constitutes any subcategory of abuse of dominance under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(“MRFTA”) is, to some extent, unclear. Furthermore, KFTC’s product market definition excluding online marketplaces is likely an issue to be revisited at the appellate stage, given that it arguably failed to shed light on the importance of actual consumer behaviors as well as a recent trend in multi-platform convergence. Last but not least, KFTC’s attempt to incorporate the much-debated leveraging theory into the framework of the Posco doctrine established by the Supreme Court will likely be challenged at the litigation. Self-preferencing cases in different jurisdictions such as European Commission’s Google Shopping decision and UK Streetmap case share both factual circumstances(modifying an algorithm at issue) and legal analysis(leveraging theory applied) in common with the Naver Shopping case. What makes the KFTC case distinguished from the two European cases, however, would be its giving weight to the subjective element(anticompetitive intent) of the abuse-a mandate from the Supreme Court’s Posco precedent. Not surprisingly, an online platform can have the mixed intent of promoting consumer welfare and convenience in upstream general search services and putting its own goods/services at competitive edge in downstream markets at the same time. A comparative law insight from the UK Streetmap case tells us that when anticompetitive effects of the platform’s self-prefencing are far from being clear-cut, a multi-layered intent of the platform can step into the analysis to resolve a close case. When it comes to anticompetitive effect, some key external factors (e.g. quality improvement in search services, changing patterns in user preference, etc.) should be integrated into the analytic process of demonstrating causality between self-preferencing and diversion of user traffic.
Abstract
“Self-preferencing” by vertically-integrated online platforms(“VOPs”) currently comes under fierce scrutiny by competition authorities around the world. In a digital ecosystem, these VOPs assume a dual role both as a “rule maker” with their power to design search algorithms and at the same time as a “player” in downstream markets. While VOPs’ incentive for favorable treatment of their own goods/services over competitors is arguably an inherent element in platform businesses, their rulemaking power would certainly not be without limitation under competition law regimes. The KFTC’s recent Naver Shopping decision on self-preferencing left the Korean antitrust community with more questions than answers in at least three aspects. In the first place, statutory interpretation on whether Naver Shopping’s favoring of its affiliate constitutes any subcategory of abuse of dominance under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(“MRFTA”) is, to some extent, unclear. Furthermore, KFTC’s product market definition excluding online marketplaces is likely an issue to be revisited at the appellate stage, given that it arguably failed to shed light on the importance of actual consumer behaviors as well as a recent trend in multi-platform convergence. Last but not least, KFTC’s attempt to incorporate the much-debated leveraging theory into the framework of the Posco doctrine established by the Supreme Court will likely be challenged at the litigation. Self-preferencing cases in different jurisdictions such as European Commission’s Google Shopping decision and UK Streetmap case share both factual circumstances(modifying an algorithm at issue) and legal analysis(leveraging theory applied) in common with the Naver Shopping case. What makes the KFTC case distinguished from the two European cases, however, would be its giving weight to the subjective element(anticompetitive intent) of the abuse-a mandate from the Supreme Court’s Posco precedent. Not surprisingly, an online platform can have the mixed intent of promoting consumer welfare and convenience in upstream general search services and putting its own goods/services at competitive edge in downstream markets at the same time. A comparative law insight from the UK Streetmap case tells us that when anticompetitive effects of the platform’s self-prefencing are far from being clear-cut, a multi-layered intent of the platform can step into the analysis to resolve a close case. When it comes to anticompetitive effect, some key external factors (e.g. quality improvement in search services, changing patterns in user preference, etc.) should be integrated into the analytic process of demonstrating causality between self-preferencing and diversion of user traffic.
참고문헌 (33)
- 강지원, "플랫폼 M&A와 독과점: 배달앱 기업결합 사건의 시사점", 이슈와 논점 제1845호, 국회입법조사처, 2021.6.3, ~ (2021)
- 강지원, "EU의 온라인 플랫폼 규칙 시행이 유통분야에 주는 시사점", 유통법연구, 7(1), pp.41~79 (2020), 한국유통법학회
- 공정거래위원회, "보호대상 기술 범위 확대 등 4개 행정규칙 개정안 행정예고", 공정거래위원회 보도자료 2021.9.30, ~ (2021)
- 공정거래위원회, "부당하게 자사 서비스를 우선 노출한 네이버쇼핑·동영상 제재", 공정거래위원회 보도자료 2020.10.6, ~ (2020)
- 권오승, "독점규제법: 이론과 실무" (2017), 법문사
- 김규식, "미국의 빅테크 기업에 대한 반독점 규제 강화 동향", 경쟁저널, (208) (2021), 한국공정경쟁연합회
- 김성만, "네이버쇼핑 자사서비스 우대 심결사건에 대한 법적 검토 - 시장지배적 지위 남용행위 적용을 중심으로 -", 경제법연구, 20(1), pp.149~179 (2021), 한국경제법학회[DOI]
- 박현규, "온라인 플랫폼 사업자의 시장지배적지위 남용행위에 대한 연구", 석사, pp.2016
- 양용현, "미국의 플랫폼 반독점법안 도입과 시사점", KDI FOCUS 통권 제109호, 한국개발연구원, ~ (2021)
- 이봉의, "디지털플랫폼의 자사 서비스 우선에 대한 경쟁법의 쟁점 - Monopoly Leverage와 Equal Treatment를 중심으로 -", 법학연구, 30(3), pp.365~407 (2020), 법학연구원[DOI]
- 이봉의, "공정거래법상 부당한 사업활동방해의 경쟁제한성 판단 - 현대·기아차 판결을 중심으로 -", 法學論文集, 41(2), pp.147~170 (2017), 법학연구원[DOI]
- 이봉의, "ICT 분야 플랫폼의 개념과 경쟁법적 함의", 경쟁과법, (7) (2016), 서울대학교 법학연구소 경쟁법센터
- 이황, "디자인 변경에 대한 경쟁법 규제와 구글쇼핑 사건", 선진상사법률연구, (90), pp.65~106 (2020), 법무부
- 이상윤, "검색 중립성과 경쟁법 집행원리", 경쟁법연구, 40, pp.260~305 (2019), 한국경쟁법학회[DOI]
- 신영수, "시장지배적 사업자에 의한 사업활동방해 행위의 성립 요건: 유료방송시장을 중심으로", 경제법판례연구, 6 (2010), 경제법판례연구회
- 장품, "플랫폼 경쟁법" (2021), 박영사
- 정영진, "MS 사건의 국제경쟁법적 의의", 경쟁저널, (125) (2006), 한국공정경쟁연합회
- 주진열, "티브로드 사건에 대한 고찰: 시장지배력 전이 이론을 중심으로", 경쟁법연구, 25, pp.244~277 (2012), 한국경쟁법학회[DOI]
- 홍대식, "간격 좁히기: 국제 경쟁법으로의 수렴 또는 그로부터의 분산 -한국 경쟁법상 단독행위 규제를 중심으로-", 경쟁법연구, 31, pp.85~129 (2015), 한국경쟁법학회
- Alison Jones, "European Competition Law" (2015), Oxford University Press
- Antonio Buttà, "Google Search(Shopping): an Overview of the European Commission’s Antitrust Case", Italian Antitrust Review, (1) (2018)
- Eleanor M. Fox, "Platforms, Power, and the Antitrust Challenges: A modest Proposal to Narrow the U.S.-Europe Divide", Neb. L. Rev., 98, pp.297~ (2019)
- The EU Digital Markets Act: A Report from a Penal of Economic Experts, "European Commission", ~ (2021)
- Inge Graef, "Differentiated Treatment in Platform-to-Business Relations", Yearbook of European Law, 38(1) (2019)
- Ioannis Kokkoris, "The Google Saga: episode I", European Competition Journal, 14(2), pp.2~3 (2018)
- Justin P. Johnson, "Online Marketplaces and Vertical Integration: Prospects for Harm", Antitrust, 35(1) (2020), ABA Antitrust Law Section
- Magali Eben, "Fining Google: a missed opportunity for legal certainty?", European Competition Journal, 14, pp.1~ (2018)
- Nicholas Banasevic, "Lessons from the Google Shopping decision", Concurrences, (2) (2018)
- Patrick F. Todd, "Digital Platforms and the Leverage Problem", Neb. L. Rev, 98, pp.496~ (2019)
- Pinar Akman, "The Theory of Abuse Google Search: A Positive and Normative Assessment under EU Competition Law", Journal of Law, Technology, and Policy, 12(4) (2016)
- Reuters, "EU court to rule on Google’s $2.8 bln EU antitrust fine on Nov.10-sources", ~ (2021)
- Thomas Graf, "Do We Need to Regulate Equal Treatment?: The Google Shopping Case and the Implications of Its Equal Treatment Principle for New Legislative Initiatives", J. of Euro. Com. L. & P, 11(10) (2020)
- Thomas Höppner, "Duty to Treat Downstream Rivals Equally: (Merely) a Natural Remedy to Google’s Monopoly Leveraging Abuse", European Competition & Regulatory Law Review, 1(3) (2017)