수직통합 온라인 플랫폼의 자사우대 행위의 경쟁제한성 판단기준에 관한 연구
A Study on Assessing Criteria of Anti-competitiveness of Self-preferencing Practices by Vertically Integrated Online Platforms
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This article examines the criteria for assessing anti-competitiveness of self-preferencing practices by vertically integrated online platforms such as Google, Naver, and Amazon. Self-preferencing practices refer to the preferential treatment of the platform's own products or services over those of its rivals in downstream markets. It is considered an exemplary type of exclusionary conducts by market dominant online platforms. This article analyzes the different approaches adopted by various competition law jurisdictions in assessing the anti-competitiveness of self-preferencing practices by comparing various competition law cases including Google Search case and Naver Shopping case of the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and Korea, etc. It is found that each competition law jurisdiction has taken quite a different approach to self-preferencing practices. This article also analyzes the monopoly leverage theory and prohibition of discriminatory treatment under competition law and related case laws. This article highlights that while there are differences in the approaches of various competition law jurisdictions in assessing the anti-competitiveness of self-preferencing practices, a balance between the effect of restraining competition and that of enhancing consumer welfare of self-preferencing practices should be struck. Hence, it concludes that competition authorities and courts should take a more balanced and contextual analysis that takes into account the specific characteristics of the online platforms and contexts of self-preferencing practices at issue. This suggests that competition authorities and courts should adopt a case-by-case approach and be vigilant to the potential consumer welfare-enhancing effects as well as anti-competitive effects of self-preferencing practices by vertically integrated online platforms.
Abstract
This article examines the criteria for assessing anti-competitiveness of self-preferencing practices by vertically integrated online platforms such as Google, Naver, and Amazon. Self-preferencing practices refer to the preferential treatment of the platform's own products or services over those of its rivals in downstream markets. It is considered an exemplary type of exclusionary conducts by market dominant online platforms. This article analyzes the different approaches adopted by various competition law jurisdictions in assessing the anti-competitiveness of self-preferencing practices by comparing various competition law cases including Google Search case and Naver Shopping case of the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and Korea, etc. It is found that each competition law jurisdiction has taken quite a different approach to self-preferencing practices. This article also analyzes the monopoly leverage theory and prohibition of discriminatory treatment under competition law and related case laws. This article highlights that while there are differences in the approaches of various competition law jurisdictions in assessing the anti-competitiveness of self-preferencing practices, a balance between the effect of restraining competition and that of enhancing consumer welfare of self-preferencing practices should be struck. Hence, it concludes that competition authorities and courts should take a more balanced and contextual analysis that takes into account the specific characteristics of the online platforms and contexts of self-preferencing practices at issue. This suggests that competition authorities and courts should adopt a case-by-case approach and be vigilant to the potential consumer welfare-enhancing effects as well as anti-competitive effects of self-preferencing practices by vertically integrated online platforms.
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