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고종의 軍統帥權 강화시도와 무산과정 연구-대한제국의 멸망원인과 관련하여-

King Gojong's attempt of strengthening his control overthe army, and how he failed-examination of one of thereasons behind the Daehan Empire's fall

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Since the early days of King Gojong's reign, and through the Daehan imperial period, he continued to organize the army chain of command, in order to have his orders swiftly obeyed and systematically employed through the Muwi-so office, the Gunmu-sa office and the Wonsu-bu headquarters. Ultimately, he intended to reinforce his authority over the army. In the early and middle stages of the reign of King Gojong, the Byeongjo Ministry under the Euijeong-bu assembly continued to function as the traditional office in charge of army-related matters. Yet later, some of the jurisdictions were transferred to other offices, such as the Muwi-so office (which started as a guard unit for the royal family), and the Gunmu-sa office(in the Naea-mun wing, which was in charge of devising and promoting the policy of ‘civilization and country-strengthening') since the 1880s. These new offices shared the responsibility with the Byeongjo Ministry. So the chain of command came to feature a dualistic situation. Then, during the Gabo-year reform period, army-related matters were transferred to the GunmuAmun office, which was put in charge of all the affairs that had been overseen by both the Gunmu-sa office and the Byeongjo Ministry. The dualistic situation was finally ended. In the Daehan Empire Period, Gojong founded the Wonsu-bu HQ. He placed it at the center of the army chain of command, granted the office enormous amount of power, and wished to reinforce his own ruling authority over the country. It can be said that Gojong succeeded in having his orders implemented in a systematic fashion, to some degree. In the meantime, his personnel appointments to important army posts failed to go smoothly as he planned, and Gojong's attempt to establish new supporters of the regime inside the army failed as well. The army personnel who had been in the office since the early days of Gojong's reign, the members of the Min house family who were also relatives to the Queen, the crony factions which rapidly rose to power during the Daehan empire period, were all at one point assigned to important army command posts. Yet their stay in such posts never lasted that long, and they all failed to establish themselves as long-term supporters for the King inside the army. In record, during the Daehan Empire Period, total of 34 army-division ministers came and went during the time frame of 9 years, serving the office for 96.6 days each. And inside the Gunmu-guk office, which was the most integral part of the Wonsu-bu HQ, 24 people came and went during a 6-year period, showing 91 days(mere three months) each at the office. Besides, one of the army ministers that served the imperial government was asked to step down the second day he was appointed to the seat(his stay at the seat was the briefest among many ministers). And one secretary-general of the Wonsu-bu HQ was abruptly replaced after only a week. This kind of unstable serving terms and abrupt ending of the ministers' service severly de-stabilized King Gojong's control over the army. This shaky status of the military appointments, was a result of a power-game that was waged and continuing among the crony groups of the King, and also the ongoing conflicts between domestic political factions which tended to respond very sensitively to the foreign situations that were happening abroad. Gojong tried to elicit loyalty and obeyance from various political factions by at one point assigning individuals from a particular faction to important posts, and then later replacing them with other individuals from another faction, with a rather short interval. Unfortunately, such efforts did not culminate in establishing a solid central base aiding the King. Instead it resulted in a situation where there was actually no more faction left to guard the royal power. It rendered the Daehan Empire extremely vulnerable before the intentions of the Japanese. The loss of army control eventually led to the dissolution of the army itself. Gojong was also embroiled in the power struggles that broke out among his own cronies, and that made it more difficult for him to establish stable control over the army factions. When the Japanese hindered Gojong's attempts to secure control over the army with all kinds of legal managements, the Daehan Imperial Government could not respond swiftly and accordingly. The breaking-up of domestic political factions, the King's failure to establish a solid power base throughout the government with himself at the center, and the failure to achieve a stable leadership. Furthermore, the overall aspect of seeking domestic political power against the backdrop of the presence of foreign powers provided an easy path for Japan to maneuver the Pro-Japanese. It would have helped Gojong run the army effectively and even garner further support, ultimately paved the way to the Daehan Empire's fall.

Abstract

Since the early days of King Gojong's reign, and through the Daehan imperial period, he continued to organize the army chain of command, in order to have his orders swiftly obeyed and systematically employed through the Muwi-so office, the Gunmu-sa office and the Wonsu-bu headquarters. Ultimately, he intended to reinforce his authority over the army. In the early and middle stages of the reign of King Gojong, the Byeongjo Ministry under the Euijeong-bu assembly continued to function as the traditional office in charge of army-related matters. Yet later, some of the jurisdictions were transferred to other offices, such as the Muwi-so office (which started as a guard unit for the royal family), and the Gunmu-sa office(in the Naea-mun wing, which was in charge of devising and promoting the policy of ‘civilization and country-strengthening') since the 1880s. These new offices shared the responsibility with the Byeongjo Ministry. So the chain of command came to feature a dualistic situation. Then, during the Gabo-year reform period, army-related matters were transferred to the GunmuAmun office, which was put in charge of all the affairs that had been overseen by both the Gunmu-sa office and the Byeongjo Ministry. The dualistic situation was finally ended. In the Daehan Empire Period, Gojong founded the Wonsu-bu HQ. He placed it at the center of the army chain of command, granted the office enormous amount of power, and wished to reinforce his own ruling authority over the country. It can be said that Gojong succeeded in having his orders implemented in a systematic fashion, to some degree. In the meantime, his personnel appointments to important army posts failed to go smoothly as he planned, and Gojong's attempt to establish new supporters of the regime inside the army failed as well. The army personnel who had been in the office since the early days of Gojong's reign, the members of the Min house family who were also relatives to the Queen, the crony factions which rapidly rose to power during the Daehan empire period, were all at one point assigned to important army command posts. Yet their stay in such posts never lasted that long, and they all failed to establish themselves as long-term supporters for the King inside the army. In record, during the Daehan Empire Period, total of 34 army-division ministers came and went during the time frame of 9 years, serving the office for 96.6 days each. And inside the Gunmu-guk office, which was the most integral part of the Wonsu-bu HQ, 24 people came and went during a 6-year period, showing 91 days(mere three months) each at the office. Besides, one of the army ministers that served the imperial government was asked to step down the second day he was appointed to the seat(his stay at the seat was the briefest among many ministers). And one secretary-general of the Wonsu-bu HQ was abruptly replaced after only a week. This kind of unstable serving terms and abrupt ending of the ministers' service severly de-stabilized King Gojong's control over the army. This shaky status of the military appointments, was a result of a power-game that was waged and continuing among the crony groups of the King, and also the ongoing conflicts between domestic political factions which tended to respond very sensitively to the foreign situations that were happening abroad. Gojong tried to elicit loyalty and obeyance from various political factions by at one point assigning individuals from a particular faction to important posts, and then later replacing them with other individuals from another faction, with a rather short interval. Unfortunately, such efforts did not culminate in establishing a solid central base aiding the King. Instead it resulted in a situation where there was actually no more faction left to guard the royal power. It rendered the Daehan Empire extremely vulnerable before the intentions of the Japanese. The loss of army control eventually led to the dissolution of the army itself. Gojong was also embroiled in the power struggles that broke out among his own cronies, and that made it more difficult for him to establish stable control over the army factions. When the Japanese hindered Gojong's attempts to secure control over the army with all kinds of legal managements, the Daehan Imperial Government could not respond swiftly and accordingly. The breaking-up of domestic political factions, the King's failure to establish a solid power base throughout the government with himself at the center, and the failure to achieve a stable leadership. Furthermore, the overall aspect of seeking domestic political power against the backdrop of the presence of foreign powers provided an easy path for Japan to maneuver the Pro-Japanese. It would have helped Gojong run the army effectively and even garner further support, ultimately paved the way to the Daehan Empire's fall.

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