한국전쟁에서 중공 지도부의 인천상륙작전 예측과정
A Study on the Chinese Government's Prediction Processof the Incheon Amphibious Landing Operations
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As soon as the Korean War broke out in 1950, the Chinese Government decided to deploy its Army near the Yalu(Amnokgang) River in order to cope with emergency situation. Especially, the Chinese Government was concerned that the North Korean People's Army(NKPA) suddenly collapsed by the UN Forces' counterattack because the NKPA started to reach the culminating point. As a result of that, the Chinese Government developed intelligence activities in the Korean Peninsula, Washington and Tokyo to judge the intervention time of the Chinese Communist Forces(CCF). So, some Chinese agents were able to obtain information about the UN Forces' Amphibious Landing Operations. It was possible that they closely reconnoitered the NKPA's front line, the UN Forces' Headquarters. After the Chinese Government got information from agents about the possibility of the UN Forces' Amphibious Landing Operations, they embodied the UN Forces' landing area and size through the simulation and war-game. As a result of the simulation, the UN Forces' landing area was Incheon and its time was in the middle of September. Mao Ze-dong informed this result of Kin Il-sung and advised him to prepare for the UN Forces' Amphibious Landing Operations as well as changed the attack to the delaying. However, Kim Il-sung, who has already occupied the 90% of the Korean Peninsula ignored Mao's advice and carried out the excessive attack. Finally, the NKPA was cut off its withdrawal routes and the Line of Communication(LOC) as well as annihilated its strengths by the Incheon Amphibious Landing Operations. Thus, the Chinese Government's prediction was so accurately, so others couldn't easily believe it. However, its process was similar to the current intelligence processing and deducted by several channels and scientific simulation. Therefore, we shouldn't devaluate its prediction as deification phenomenon. Rather, we'd better consider its prediction as the result of active information gathering activities and its military experience such as the long march and the anti-Japanese fight.
Abstract
As soon as the Korean War broke out in 1950, the Chinese Government decided to deploy its Army near the Yalu(Amnokgang) River in order to cope with emergency situation. Especially, the Chinese Government was concerned that the North Korean People's Army(NKPA) suddenly collapsed by the UN Forces' counterattack because the NKPA started to reach the culminating point. As a result of that, the Chinese Government developed intelligence activities in the Korean Peninsula, Washington and Tokyo to judge the intervention time of the Chinese Communist Forces(CCF). So, some Chinese agents were able to obtain information about the UN Forces' Amphibious Landing Operations. It was possible that they closely reconnoitered the NKPA's front line, the UN Forces' Headquarters. After the Chinese Government got information from agents about the possibility of the UN Forces' Amphibious Landing Operations, they embodied the UN Forces' landing area and size through the simulation and war-game. As a result of the simulation, the UN Forces' landing area was Incheon and its time was in the middle of September. Mao Ze-dong informed this result of Kin Il-sung and advised him to prepare for the UN Forces' Amphibious Landing Operations as well as changed the attack to the delaying. However, Kim Il-sung, who has already occupied the 90% of the Korean Peninsula ignored Mao's advice and carried out the excessive attack. Finally, the NKPA was cut off its withdrawal routes and the Line of Communication(LOC) as well as annihilated its strengths by the Incheon Amphibious Landing Operations. Thus, the Chinese Government's prediction was so accurately, so others couldn't easily believe it. However, its process was similar to the current intelligence processing and deducted by several channels and scientific simulation. Therefore, we shouldn't devaluate its prediction as deification phenomenon. Rather, we'd better consider its prediction as the result of active information gathering activities and its military experience such as the long march and the anti-Japanese fight.
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