맥아더의 전략 vs. 김일성의 전략 : 게임이론을 통해 본 인천상륙작전
MacArthur's strategy Vs. Kim, Il Sung strategy : Game theory and Inchenon landing operation
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
One important objective for those at war is to achieve victory with the least casualties of our side as possible. For the objective, the history of wars and the roles of prominent leaders have been receiving attentions. But those knowledge may not be useful in war zones of different time and place since the circumstances are too variable to apply them. In this article, we will discuss how to consider a countermeasure in response to the enemy by looking at the Incheon Landing Operation, the turning point of the Korean War. Specifically, how the war had proceeded depending on General MacArthur and Il Sung Kim’s strategies will be the main subject. General MacArthur had successfully prevented Il Sung Kim from predicting Incheon as a possible target by using the historical material as more systematic and quantified intelligence. That is, he took various deceptive strategies to make Il Sung Kim not only to believe that Incheon is not a top priority target, but also to predict when to landing, where and how many to land. Which in turn could lead to the victory of the operation.
Abstract
One important objective for those at war is to achieve victory with the least casualties of our side as possible. For the objective, the history of wars and the roles of prominent leaders have been receiving attentions. But those knowledge may not be useful in war zones of different time and place since the circumstances are too variable to apply them. In this article, we will discuss how to consider a countermeasure in response to the enemy by looking at the Incheon Landing Operation, the turning point of the Korean War. Specifically, how the war had proceeded depending on General MacArthur and Il Sung Kim’s strategies will be the main subject. General MacArthur had successfully prevented Il Sung Kim from predicting Incheon as a possible target by using the historical material as more systematic and quantified intelligence. That is, he took various deceptive strategies to make Il Sung Kim not only to believe that Incheon is not a top priority target, but also to predict when to landing, where and how many to land. Which in turn could lead to the victory of the operation.
참고문헌 (25)
- 국방부 군사편찬연구소, "인천상륙작전과 반격작전", ~ (2009)
- 가르릴 코로트코프, "스탈린과 김일성 2" (1993), 동아일보사
- 김광수, "인천상륙작전은 기습이 아니었는가?", 전사
- 노병천, "도해손자병법" (1990), 도서출판 가나문화사
- 노병천, "이것이 한국전쟁이다" (2000), 21세기 군사연구소
- 박명림, "한국전쟁: 전세의 역전과 북한의 대응(1)", 전략연구, 4 (1997)
- 왕규호, "게임이론" (2004), 박영사
- 육군본부, "군사용어사전", ~ (2006)
- 온창일, "한민족 전쟁사", 집문당
- 손자, "손자병법" (1999), 책세상
- 신성휘, "게임이론 길라잡이" (2003), 박영사
- 애나비쉬 K. 딕시트, "전략적 사고" (1993), 다음세대
- 해병대 사령부, "해병대 전투사 제1집 증보판" (2001)
- 김완진, "경제적 합리성과 게임이론, 철학사상" (2005), 서울대학교
- 이선호, "맥아더 장군과 9.15 인천상륙작전", 군사저널
- von Neumann, J., "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" (1944), Princeton University Press
- Aumann, R., "Agreeing to Disagree" (1984), Annals of Statistics
- A. Sen, "Rational Pool: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundation of Economic Theory" (1977), Philosophy and Public Affairs
- Lewis, D., "Convention" (1969), Harvard University Press
- Myerson, R., "Game Theory" (1991), Harvard Univ. Press
- Nash, J., "Non-cooperative games" (1951), Annals of Mathematics
- Nash, J., "Equilibrium points in n-person games", Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences, 통권 : 36 (1950)
- Hirshleifer, Jack, "The analysis of uncertainty and information" (1992), Cambridge Unviersity Press
- J. Harsanyi, "Advances in Understanding Rational Behvior" (1977), Elster
- R. Nozick, "The Nature of Rationality" (1993), Princeton University Press