한국전쟁 초기 중국군의 군사전략과 전술 변화양상 연구

Abstract

The Korean War was a serious crisis to the Chinese Communists Forces (CCF) as the first case of their forces’ intervention in a war abroad at that time when they had just finished a revolutionary war and started to form the strategy for international war. In this study, the key purpose of the CCF in a war was to secure a buffer zone through survival of the North Korea Regime, the key means was a large scale of combat unit which had its kind of military tradition and an experience of winning a series of war against the strong. Furthermore the CCF kept consistently the big purpose of holding the leadership of a war and securing a buffer zone, and also a purpose and means of strategy and tactics level had been changed smoothly by their own condition. The CCF was adaptable to wait for the moment when definitely advantageous situation was developed also in committing troops and strengthening equipments, and it decided fluidly by condition. However, the CCF could not overcome elaborate counterattack by the UN Forces that had been developed since 1951 owing to the absence of their ultimate counter-plan. Strategy and tactics of the CCF was much influenced by the time-honored tradition since Sūnzi expressed clearly the nature of a war, Clausewitz’ On War, and so on, and they pursued a never-losing war by digesting this with the method of shíshì qiúshì. While Mao Tse-tung assumed even the worst situation, he encountered adaptable the result of military operation. The CCF held an advantageous position in the 1st and 2nd Campaigns, they attacked with concentrating on apparent goal, that was they were a national division, based on superiority of speed and sudden attack, and they developed the way how they controled the main forces early on a war by strategical and tactical siege. In the 3rd Campaign, they began to attack for the political purpose first, with considering the 38th Parallel as psychological line of resistance, but they didn’t pursue the improvement of fruits of battle down to the south of the 37th Parallel. In the 4th and 5th Campaigns, they confirmed their limit, and they made an opportunity to confirm position operations as the best plan by considering their own real ability. After considering all factors of the period before the CCF operated in the Korean War, there was no apparent change on tactical side. In this study, it considered change of military strategy and tactics with th following hypothesis, “the CCF pursued the harmony of purpose and means in a war before their operated.” As examined through the period before the whole operation, this hypothesis was harmonized successfully in setting up the purpose and providing sufficient means in the 1st and the 2nd Campaigns, but there was the limit on strategical success because tactical purpose, that was annihilation of the main forces were not complete in the 3rd Campaign. And in the 4th and 5th Campaigns, tactical units didn’t keep the leadership without a hitch in battle situation, so they didn’t accumulate sufficiently tactical victory, also they didn’t collapse the UN Forces’ line of defense even with committing a large scale of new unit, and they failed to harmonize purpose and means by pursuing the purpose beyond means on war, strategy, and tactical side. That is to say, the CCF produced its kind of fruit in the early Korean War with pursuing the purpose meeting means, that is substantial military strength, but they didn’t overcome essential inferiority, blocked to achieve tactical goal, and then a tactical victory failed to contribute as a means to achieve strategical purpose. Then the CCF spreaded position operations that they prescribed with pursuing the purpose of maintaining a buffer zone, and targeted on restoring the original state before the Korean War by the Truce Talks owing to gradual extinction of the UN Forces and military forces.