북한의 군사정책결정 및 지휘체계에 관한 연구
A Study on the Decision of Military Policies andCommand System in North Korea
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The decision of military policies and command system in North Korea are different from ordinary nations in characteristics. Firstly, the decision of military policies is made on Kim Jeong-il's own judgment with the reports submitted through the vertical channel without horizontal discussion of various policy issues by related agencies. Secondly, the fact that the policies are set up extemporaneously by a few persons around is helpful to quick decision making but it restricts the formation of reasonable and balanced policies by ignoring the actual situation of the field. It is impossible to decide or execute any policy directions without the approval of Kim Jeong- il. The centralized authoritarian rule has an advantage of making it easy to control. However, it can cause problems in two respects. Firstly, though Kim Jeong-il emphasizes that all the drafts of policies undergo policy agreement by related agencies in advance, the policies are usually decided and executed by the ratification of Kim Jeong-il and as a result decisions are made dually without the policy agreement in advance. Secondly, the influential group in special agencies such as the party or army may commit abuse of power and graft under the pretext of approved documents. Furthermore, there is no means of sanction if a coup breaks out against the regime when Kim Jeong-il cannot control the party due to health problem. The military command system in North Korea has a dual system controlled by the party and the army. The highest in the hierarchy are the Party Committee in the North Korean People's Army(NKPA) and the General Politburo in the NKPA, and the party organization and political agencies directly belonging to them are dispatched even to the terminal squad to control the military in substance. Such a dual command system makes it easy for the superior authorities to command quickly and exert integrated military power through a thoroughly centralized powerful control which does not allow the leeway of the commanders of individual military units. However, the superior authorities of the NKPA give detailed instructions and strictly control and watch the subordinate commanders with distrust while the subordinate commanders make operations inflexibly. As a result, their coping ability is weak when the situation suddenly changes or the information system between the top and bottom is disconnected. The study on the decision of military policies and command system showision othe military commander cannot control his military unit flexibly n ohis own wi mibut is a person in charge of the administron in cperating the military unit by the instruction of the General Politburo. As a result, they have limited flexibility compared to the commanders of the Republic charorea Armed Forces, and thus cannot cope actively with environnviral changes in time of emergency.
Abstract
The decision of military policies and command system in North Korea are different from ordinary nations in characteristics. Firstly, the decision of military policies is made on Kim Jeong-il's own judgment with the reports submitted through the vertical channel without horizontal discussion of various policy issues by related agencies. Secondly, the fact that the policies are set up extemporaneously by a few persons around is helpful to quick decision making but it restricts the formation of reasonable and balanced policies by ignoring the actual situation of the field. It is impossible to decide or execute any policy directions without the approval of Kim Jeong- il. The centralized authoritarian rule has an advantage of making it easy to control. However, it can cause problems in two respects. Firstly, though Kim Jeong-il emphasizes that all the drafts of policies undergo policy agreement by related agencies in advance, the policies are usually decided and executed by the ratification of Kim Jeong-il and as a result decisions are made dually without the policy agreement in advance. Secondly, the influential group in special agencies such as the party or army may commit abuse of power and graft under the pretext of approved documents. Furthermore, there is no means of sanction if a coup breaks out against the regime when Kim Jeong-il cannot control the party due to health problem. The military command system in North Korea has a dual system controlled by the party and the army. The highest in the hierarchy are the Party Committee in the North Korean People's Army(NKPA) and the General Politburo in the NKPA, and the party organization and political agencies directly belonging to them are dispatched even to the terminal squad to control the military in substance. Such a dual command system makes it easy for the superior authorities to command quickly and exert integrated military power through a thoroughly centralized powerful control which does not allow the leeway of the commanders of individual military units. However, the superior authorities of the NKPA give detailed instructions and strictly control and watch the subordinate commanders with distrust while the subordinate commanders make operations inflexibly. As a result, their coping ability is weak when the situation suddenly changes or the information system between the top and bottom is disconnected. The study on the decision of military policies and command system showision othe military commander cannot control his military unit flexibly n ohis own wi mibut is a person in charge of the administron in cperating the military unit by the instruction of the General Politburo. As a result, they have limited flexibility compared to the commanders of the Republic charorea Armed Forces, and thus cannot cope actively with environnviral changes in time of emergency.
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