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화령장 전투의 군사적 재조명과 의의

Reexamination of the Hwaryeongjang Battle andIts Military Meaning

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Studying history of war is the most effective way for military personnel who haven't participated in actual war to build a sense of war. In the same aspect, we're able to learn much about war from the history of Korean War. The Hwaryeongjang Battle, which I am trying to deal with in this paper, is the victorious battle that took place in 1950 from July 17th to July 25th, when the ROK (Republic of Korea) Army was conducting a delaying operation at Sobaek mountain range. After receiving information that North Korean troops were to attack towards the Sangju and Hwaryeongjang routes, the ROK Army gave a defensive order to the ROK 17th Infantry Regiment. The 17th Infantry Regiment prepared an ambush attack near Hwaryeongjang and conducted a surprise attack against two regiments under North Korean 15th Infantry Division. This is known to be one of the most considerable military achievements of the Korean War. Consequently, all troops including the regiment commander were specially promoted to a higher rank. The victory raised the morale of the ROK troops when the army was under adverse circumstances. Nevertheless, because of the lack of follow-up studies, the Hwaryeongjang Battle is not enough educated. Also, it seems that there is a tendency of incorrect recordings of the order of battle (OB) of the North Korean 15th Division and partial distortions of the combat progresses including operation map. In this paper, I tried to recompose the accurate combat progress from many angles based on the basic historical materials possessed and the updated data from the communists party. I analyzed lessons learned from the Hwaryeongjang Battle with a view of operational level and tactical level. Facing crisis, the ROK Army Headquarters gave several combat orders, reassigning available combat strengths and ordered the 17th Infantry Regiment to put an end to the North Korean troops' attacks towards Hwaryeongjang. The commander of the 17th Infantry Regiment made every effort to collect useful information and to utilize terrain to be fully prepared for combat and conducted the ambush attack successfully. From an operational aspect, the meaning of the victory in the Hwaryeongjang Battle is as follows. First, it frustrated North Korea's plan to surround and destroy the main body of the US 24th Division and the ROK 6th Division in the Sobaek mountain range. Second, it provided time for the ROK Army to reorganize units and adjust the frontline. Third, it contributed to the formation of the Busan Perimeter (Nakdong River Defense Line) to the UN Forces. From a tactical aspect, the lessons we learned are as follows. First, they were able to carry out an ambush attack at the right time because of continuous collection and utilization of informations. Second, they conducted a surprise attack successfully making full use of terrain. Third, they maximized the combat results with close command and control and concealment of attempt. Finally, they destroyed the main force as big as azedvision with only the combat strength of one regiment. This battle is recorded as a typical example of a small unit that achieved victory over a bigger unit. I hope that through this paper the Hwaryeongjang battle would be reexamined carefully in a military historical view, and that it would help encourage militarism among our ROK Army.

Abstract

Studying history of war is the most effective way for military personnel who haven't participated in actual war to build a sense of war. In the same aspect, we're able to learn much about war from the history of Korean War. The Hwaryeongjang Battle, which I am trying to deal with in this paper, is the victorious battle that took place in 1950 from July 17th to July 25th, when the ROK (Republic of Korea) Army was conducting a delaying operation at Sobaek mountain range. After receiving information that North Korean troops were to attack towards the Sangju and Hwaryeongjang routes, the ROK Army gave a defensive order to the ROK 17th Infantry Regiment. The 17th Infantry Regiment prepared an ambush attack near Hwaryeongjang and conducted a surprise attack against two regiments under North Korean 15th Infantry Division. This is known to be one of the most considerable military achievements of the Korean War. Consequently, all troops including the regiment commander were specially promoted to a higher rank. The victory raised the morale of the ROK troops when the army was under adverse circumstances. Nevertheless, because of the lack of follow-up studies, the Hwaryeongjang Battle is not enough educated. Also, it seems that there is a tendency of incorrect recordings of the order of battle (OB) of the North Korean 15th Division and partial distortions of the combat progresses including operation map. In this paper, I tried to recompose the accurate combat progress from many angles based on the basic historical materials possessed and the updated data from the communists party. I analyzed lessons learned from the Hwaryeongjang Battle with a view of operational level and tactical level. Facing crisis, the ROK Army Headquarters gave several combat orders, reassigning available combat strengths and ordered the 17th Infantry Regiment to put an end to the North Korean troops' attacks towards Hwaryeongjang. The commander of the 17th Infantry Regiment made every effort to collect useful information and to utilize terrain to be fully prepared for combat and conducted the ambush attack successfully. From an operational aspect, the meaning of the victory in the Hwaryeongjang Battle is as follows. First, it frustrated North Korea's plan to surround and destroy the main body of the US 24th Division and the ROK 6th Division in the Sobaek mountain range. Second, it provided time for the ROK Army to reorganize units and adjust the frontline. Third, it contributed to the formation of the Busan Perimeter (Nakdong River Defense Line) to the UN Forces. From a tactical aspect, the lessons we learned are as follows. First, they were able to carry out an ambush attack at the right time because of continuous collection and utilization of informations. Second, they conducted a surprise attack successfully making full use of terrain. Third, they maximized the combat results with close command and control and concealment of attempt. Finally, they destroyed the main force as big as azedvision with only the combat strength of one regiment. This battle is recorded as a typical example of a small unit that achieved victory over a bigger unit. I hope that through this paper the Hwaryeongjang battle would be reexamined carefully in a military historical view, and that it would help encourage militarism among our ROK Army.

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