6․25전쟁기 현리-한계 전투의 전술적 교훈

Abstract

In war-historically analyzing the Hyeonri-Hangye Battle, I will analyze how the UN Forces and the CCF won and lost their battles concentrating on their operational guidance and relative information. First, I studied historical facts such as the US Army's estimations of the scale of CCF's main forces' intentions, and CCF's deep penetration. As a result I've found out that although in previous researches on US Army's intelligence it says that 'the US Army did not know where the CCF's main forces were headed', they knew the CCF's operation intentions beforehand, by studying US Army and CCF's data. Especially, it's stated in US X Corps' special report that “on May 16, US X Corps which had received CCF's concentrated attacks, attempted to fatigue the CCF by setting the units in the west as the main force and making units in the east absorb the massive attacks." Therefore we can conclude that the US Army had exactly judged the axis of CCF's main forces. As of the CCF's deep penetration, it was believed that an estimated 1~2 CCF battalions had deeply penetrated the Omachi summit. However, by studying the deep penetration units, it was confirmed that 2nd battalion of 60th CCF division's 178th regiment had first deeply penetrated the Omachi summit quickly, then 2 CCF divisions (60th, 81st Division) had followed, interdicting the area. An analysis on reasons why UN Forces and CCF won and lost battles was done based on new facts. The reasons beyond CCF's initial victories were accurate and precise preparation fire, persistent and intensive penetration, concentration of combat power, simultaneous employment of strategies, etc. The reasons beyond their loss was lack of creativity in their offensive tactics, maneuver warfare which is complicated and difficult to control, excessive outflanking action. The reasons beyond the US Army's initial losses were largely due to wrong estimates of the scale of the CCF and axis of main force as well as their weak defense of rear areas. As for their victories, the reasons were unity of the command system, quick and efficient defense systems after penetration of defense lines, and full logistical support to operating forces. After war historically studying tactical lessons of the Hyeonri- Hangye Battle, I think that this paper has a meaning itself by newly reexamining and suggesting the reasons of victory and defeat of both sides and by drawing out new facts. However unsatisfactory contents such as US Army's responses in initial operations need to be made clear, and I hope that further and various research would be conducted.