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6.25전쟁 당시 미국의 핵무기 정책-아이젠하워 정권을 중심으로-

The Korean War and Nuclear Weapon Policy of the USA - The Focus in the Eisenhower Years -

이종판
국방부군사편찬연구소 (Military History Institute, MND)|2011.03|군사 (military history)|제78호|pp. 109-127|DOI 10.29212/mh.2011..78.109

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참고문헌

키워드

한국전쟁냉전핵무기Nuclear WeaponDouglas MacArthurThe Korean War맥아더Armistice AgreementCold-War트루먼제한전쟁휴전아이젠하워Dwight David Eisenhower덜레스핵공갈Limited war. Harry S TrumanJohn Foster DullesNuclear Blackmail
주제분류역사학

초록

There some reasons why the nuclear weapons were not used in the Korean War(1950~1953). First, the nuclear strategy is not established in the situation of the limited war. Second, the atomic bomb was the weapon for strategic attack which aimed at industrial targets or traffic centers. There were not that kind of targets during the Korean War. In other words, Chinese Communist Forces whose attack exploits mountains was not the target of atomic bombing. In addition, after the atomic bomb dropping on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, using the nuclear weapon again on Asia itself was banned. Third, if the expected effect does not appear despite using the atomic bomb, it was concerned that the control function might disappear. The problems about nuclear weapon's control function were already unveiled. Bernard Brodie, one of the American nuclear strategy creator, mentioned the hardship of control in the nuclear world: “Today's weird paradox is that, though the nuclear must operate its control function, the concern about the malfunctioning of it is inherent." The nuclear threat tried by Eisenhower and Dulles was elementary but throws lots of meaning. In retrospect, Eisenhower and Dulles conceive new strategy during the presidential race in 1952, criticizing Truman's strategy. It was that American must prepare for exploiting nuclear weapons by using dominant position on nuclear when necessary. Here, the claim that psychological barrier between nuclear weapons and others should be overcome was brought forward. Eisenhower did not entirely agree on Dulles' viewpoint regarding the nuclear during the election campaign but after inauguration accepted his opinion to finish the Korean War and when faced the problem to maintain the Armistice Agreement. Nuclear threat for extracting the Armistice Agreement by American will, and nuclear threat in case of being unsolved as planned were more evident. And it is continued after the Armistice Agreement. Like this, Eisenhower and Dulles thought nuclear threat was success. Based on this, the cold war strategy under Eisenhower regime downsized old weapons and relied on nuclear weapon control. The perspective that the nuclear threat strategy was successful in terms of deriving the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War is based on misunderstanding of Eisenhower and Dulles. However, the nuclear policy formed from such misunderstanding is developed into the policy that decided the victory by nuclear weapons in a series of crisis in 1950's Asia.

Abstract

There some reasons why the nuclear weapons were not used in the Korean War(1950~1953). First, the nuclear strategy is not established in the situation of the limited war. Second, the atomic bomb was the weapon for strategic attack which aimed at industrial targets or traffic centers. There were not that kind of targets during the Korean War. In other words, Chinese Communist Forces whose attack exploits mountains was not the target of atomic bombing. In addition, after the atomic bomb dropping on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, using the nuclear weapon again on Asia itself was banned. Third, if the expected effect does not appear despite using the atomic bomb, it was concerned that the control function might disappear. The problems about nuclear weapon's control function were already unveiled. Bernard Brodie, one of the American nuclear strategy creator, mentioned the hardship of control in the nuclear world: “Today's weird paradox is that, though the nuclear must operate its control function, the concern about the malfunctioning of it is inherent." The nuclear threat tried by Eisenhower and Dulles was elementary but throws lots of meaning. In retrospect, Eisenhower and Dulles conceive new strategy during the presidential race in 1952, criticizing Truman's strategy. It was that American must prepare for exploiting nuclear weapons by using dominant position on nuclear when necessary. Here, the claim that psychological barrier between nuclear weapons and others should be overcome was brought forward. Eisenhower did not entirely agree on Dulles' viewpoint regarding the nuclear during the election campaign but after inauguration accepted his opinion to finish the Korean War and when faced the problem to maintain the Armistice Agreement. Nuclear threat for extracting the Armistice Agreement by American will, and nuclear threat in case of being unsolved as planned were more evident. And it is continued after the Armistice Agreement. Like this, Eisenhower and Dulles thought nuclear threat was success. Based on this, the cold war strategy under Eisenhower regime downsized old weapons and relied on nuclear weapon control. The perspective that the nuclear threat strategy was successful in terms of deriving the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War is based on misunderstanding of Eisenhower and Dulles. However, the nuclear policy formed from such misunderstanding is developed into the policy that decided the victory by nuclear weapons in a series of crisis in 1950's Asia.

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