7세기 삼국 고대 전투모습의 재현

Abstract

The present study is designed to explore the various patterns of battles and commanding as well as communication systems that became different depending on the marching speed and types of actions employed in the 7th century warfare in an attempt to revive them in compliance with the available historical records. In order to investigate the marching speed in the7th century warfare, a survey was made into the materials showing the transportation strategies in the Hwangsanbeol Battle and in the Pyeongyang Castle to which Kim, Yushin tried to deliver food for the soldiers from Tang Dynasty, China. Judging from the geographical conditions, it might be possible to presume that the soldiers moved approximately 30 rior 12km a day, although no general rule could be applied to the marching speed of soldiers because it could differ should there be rugged mountain range difficult or impossible to crossover. In an extreme case, for example, the Nava lForces defeated at Salsu River moved even as far as 450 ri in just a day. The marching speed of about 30 ria day can be normally attained under the assumed situation in which a military unit moves in a battle formation preparing for any attack from the enemy while maintaining a certain distance from the supply unit. The types of battle were divided into the castle and ground warfare for examination here. The commanding post was usually positioned about 30~40 ri in advance apart from the target in preparation for castle warfare. Water and food were crucial for both attacking as well as defending sides in the castle warfare. Before start of warfare, both parties were usually engaged in apre-stage of sprit war to dishearten the enemy soldiers. After the spirit war is over, the attacking force began to fill up the moat to ease approach to the castle. There upon, attack started by means of gun carriages, pushing vehicles, fire and mounts of clay bags. Once a castle was occupied by the attacks, fighting with swords and bayonets raged in the final stage of the warfare, with the winner hoisting the flag on the castle to declare sign of its victory. For the ground warfare, acommanding camp too was established in the first place and independent unit of lesser scale was affiliated with it for each echelon. Each camp was protected by a tower with lookout and a pit to keep away the enemy. There must have been the chief commanding post to take command of small camps. The moral of soldiers, ground condition and strategies to operate military force and battle array might be a key to decision of victory or defeat in the ground warfare that did not take long to its closure. The commanding chief of staff who was about to go to the battlefield was given by the king a limited free hand to exercise subject to situation. It might also be assumed that the commanding chief delegated some portion of his authority to the commanders under his control to enable them to operate their units respectively. There were certain agreements for check-up and search to ensure correspondence between the commanding postand commanded units. During a march, there was a rule to maintain certain distance between units to allow supervision and liaison without a hitch. How could it be possible to direct military units in actual battle where dust clouds shutthe sky and orders were overshadowed by yells and shouts? The answer is drum and flag; that is, soldiers marched forward at the sound of drum, retreated at the sound of gong and changed thei rechelon formation by signal of flag.