공약신뢰문제와 이란 핵협상
The Commitment Problem and Negotiations over the Iranian Nuclear Issue
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본 연구에서는 공약신뢰문제의 관점에서 이란의 핵협상을 다룬다. 2018년 트럼프 정부의 JCPOA 합의 이탈로 인해 공약신뢰문제는 2021년 4월부터 열린 핵협상에서 주요한 문제로 부각되었다. 공약신뢰문제란 초국가적 권위가 부재한 국제적 무정부 상태에서 합의를 끝까지 이행하겠다는 신뢰할 만한 약속을 할 수 없는 문제를 가리킨다. 본 연구에서는 간단한 게임모델을 사용하여 공약신뢰문제가 해소되지 않는다면 합의가 불가능하다는 점을 보이고, 이에 따라 협상에서 어떠한 제안들이 공약신뢰문제 해결을 위한 대안으로 제시되었는가에 초점을 맞춘다. 특히 상원의 2/3의 동의를 요하는 조약 형태의 합의가 가장 법적 구속력이 있고, 따라서 가장 많은 비용을 합의 파기 시에 부과한다는 점에서 효과적이지만, 공화당의 반대와 상원의 의석 분포를 고려해 볼 때, 현실적으로는 가능하지 않은 것으로 보인다. 이란이 제시한 대응책 중에 한 가지 주목을 끄는 제안은 “내재적 보장안”이다. 이란은 미국의 합의 철회를 막기 위한 방안으로 합의 철회 시 이란이 신속하게 고농축 우라늄을 재보유할 수 있도록 하는. 다시 말하면, 핵 개발의 억제나 폐기를 불가역적인 것이 아니라 가역적인 것으로 하자는 안을 제시했다. 과연 이러한 종류의 안이 실현될 것인가는 지켜보야 할 문제지만, 공약신뢰문제 완화를 위한 어떠한 방안들이 제시되는가는 주의 깊게 지켜볼 필요가 있다. 만약 미국 이란 간 협상이 타결된다면, 공약신뢰문제에 대한 해결 방안들이 북핵 문제와 관련해서도 영향을 미칠 수 있기 때문이다.
Abstract
This study addresses the Iranian nuclear issue from a commitment problem perspective. With the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA accord by the Trump administration in 2018, the commitment problem, which refers to a dilemma that the state is unable to make credible commitments due to international anarchy construed as the lack of superior authority to enforce commitments, has come to the fore in the new nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran held since April 2021. Using a simple game theoretical model, this study shows that without ameliorating the commitment problem, no agreement would be reached, thus focusing on what initiatives can be and have been offered in the negotiations to address this problem. In particular, although a form of treaty that requires the two-thirds approval from the U.S. Senate must be the most legally-binding and, consequently, most costly form of agreement in that another U.S. withdrawal would inflict serious damage on its reputation, this kind of agreement is unlikely at present because of the Republican opposition in Congress. In response, the Iranians have offered several initiatives, including a ‘creative’ one called an “inherent guarantee,” which allows Iran to fully reverse its course so that it can acquire highly enriched uranium (HEU) again when the U.S. reneges on a new agreement. Whether this kind of initiative can be realized remains to be seen, proposed initiatives in the U.S.-Iran negotiations to address the commitment problem deserve attention because they might affect the North Korean nuclear issue, once a deal is struck between Washington and Tehran.
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