고유 명사의 의미

Abstract

This paper is a metatheoretical discussion on the meaning of linguistic expressions, specifically on the meaning of proper names. Theories of the logico-linguistic philosophers like Frege, Russel, Searle and Strawson are presented and criticized. According to these philosophers, who may be called descriptionalists, a proper name is equivalent to a certain description or a cluster of descriptions. And the reference of a proper name is determined on the basis of the sense expressed in the description, thus it can vary in different circumstances. However, Kripke argues that proper names are rigid designators, i.e., they refer to a single entity in all the possible worlds, whereas descriptions do not. The two cannot be identified. The reference of a proper name is not determined by the description but by the causal chain connecting it to the naming ceremony or the introducing event. As a matter of fact, the descriptionalists` semantics of proper names is a continuation of the traditional semantics of common nouns in the respect that the extension of a term is determined on the basis of its intension. But proper names are not like common nouns because they are rigid. And some part of common nouns, namely the natural kind terms, are also rigid as (is) shown by Putnam. But Putnam is mistaken when he subsumes the reference of a common noun under its meaning. Putnam`s meaning is so heterogeneous in that it comprises not only the reference of a term, but also the stereo-type, which is something like the intension, and the phonological, syntactic and the other facts. Proper names need not have their intensions. The meaning of a proper name is its reference. The semantics is envisaged which is based on the semiotics that is concerned only with the linguistic signs, the signifiants, and the things signified, the signifie`s. We do not need any more entities intervening between them. Thus, the concepts, Fregean senses, stereotypes and the like are to be razored off the ontology of linguistic semantics.