political or Religious Insurgencies and Different COIN Remedies - Insights from Identifying Distinction between Malaya Insurgency and Intifada -
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Is it harder for counterinsurgency (COIN) forces to defeat a religious dynamic insurgency? Although insurgency has become one of the key issues in the 21st century, as shown in Iraq and the Israeli Palestinian conflict, little attention has been paid to the effects of a religion on the whole process or the outcome of insurgency have been paid little attention. In this essay, I ask: why did the Intifada happen and how were insurgents able to be successful against COIN forces which are stronger than their forces, at the very least, from the viewpoint of military capability? I classify insurgencies into a political dynamic and a religious dynamic insurgency. Then, I explore two cases―the Malayan case as a political dynamic insurgency and the Intifada as a religious dynamic insurgency. My findings imply that unlike a politicaldynamic insurgency, a religious dynamic insurgency tends to provide insurgents with an easier environment in several support. These differences between the two types of insurgencies suggest that if a specific insurgency is closer to religious dynamic characteristics, COIN strategies need to put a higher premium on a “religious” remedy―a “soft” remedy―than a military or political remedy―a “hard” remedy. The findings also imply how important it is for COIN actors to identify the real nature of insurgency (the battleground’s dynamic logic) that they are confronted with and themselves. In addition, they shed lights on the establishment of effective COIN strategy for the ROK military that may struggle with unexpected insurgents caused by the collapse of the North Korean regime.
Abstract
Is it harder for counterinsurgency (COIN) forces to defeat a religious dynamic insurgency? Although insurgency has become one of the key issues in the 21st century, as shown in Iraq and the Israeli Palestinian conflict, little attention has been paid to the effects of a religion on the whole process or the outcome of insurgency have been paid little attention. In this essay, I ask: why did the Intifada happen and how were insurgents able to be successful against COIN forces which are stronger than their forces, at the very least, from the viewpoint of military capability? I classify insurgencies into a political dynamic and a religious dynamic insurgency. Then, I explore two cases―the Malayan case as a political dynamic insurgency and the Intifada as a religious dynamic insurgency. My findings imply that unlike a politicaldynamic insurgency, a religious dynamic insurgency tends to provide insurgents with an easier environment in several support. These differences between the two types of insurgencies suggest that if a specific insurgency is closer to religious dynamic characteristics, COIN strategies need to put a higher premium on a “religious” remedy―a “soft” remedy―than a military or political remedy―a “hard” remedy. The findings also imply how important it is for COIN actors to identify the real nature of insurgency (the battleground’s dynamic logic) that they are confronted with and themselves. In addition, they shed lights on the establishment of effective COIN strategy for the ROK military that may struggle with unexpected insurgents caused by the collapse of the North Korean regime.
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