한국전쟁 발발과 미국 트루먼 행정부의 정보실패
The Outbreak of Korean War war and The U.S. Truman Administration’s Intelligence Failure
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이 글은 한국전쟁 발발 관련 정보실패의 근본적인 책임이 정보기관이 아닌 정책결정자에게 있다는 사실을 규명하는 데 목적이 있다. 정보실패는정보기관 자체 뿐 아니라 정책결정자의 정보 무시나 오만과 같은 정보외적요인(non-intelligence factor)에 의해서도 자주 발생한다. 정보기관 자체에 의해 유발된 정보실패가 아닌 경우에는 정책결정자들에 의한 정보실패, 즉 ‘정책실패’ (policy failure)로 보는 것이 타당하다. 한국전쟁 발발 전후 CIA, 맥아더 사령부 한국지부(KLO), 한국군사고문단(KMAG) 등 여러 기관들이 대북정보 업무를 수행하고 있었다. 1948년 초부터 이들 기관들은 북한군의 증강실태와 전략적 기습 가능성에 대해 경보해왔다. 그러나 상충되고 부정확한 정보를 생산했기 때문에 정책결정자들로부터 신뢰를 얻거나 정책변화를 유도하지 못했다. 그러나, 루머와 역정보가 난무한 상황에서 첩보를 검증할 수 있는 기술정보 수단 없었기 때문에, 북한군의 능력과 기습 시기를 정확히 예측할 수 없었던 불가항력적인측면이 있었다. 물론, 정보기관도 정책결정자들과 긴밀히 협의하면서 이들의 관심과 유도하지 못했다는 점에서 일정 부분 정보실패 책임에서 자유로울 수 없다. 한편, 트루먼을 비롯한 고위 관료들은 한반도의 전략적 가치를 낮게 보면서 애치슨 국무장관의 미국의 방위선에서 한국 배제 선언, 주한미군 철수, 군사원조 삭감 등의 조치를 단행했다. 이는 소극적이었던 소련의 태도를 적극적인 대북 관여 정책으로 전환시켰다. 그러나, 미국의 정책결정자들은 “북한은 소련의 위성국가이며 전면전은 결코 발생하지 않을 것”이라는 고정 관념에 사로 잡혀 있었으며 북한 침공 가능성에 대한 경고에 관심을 기울이지 않았다. 연이은 경고에도 불구하고, 정책결정자들은 어떠한정책적 대응도 고려하지 않았다. 사실, 정보실패는 어느 일방의 실책만이아닌 복합적인 요인에 의해 발생했다. 그러나 불충분한 정보에 대해서도관심과 주의를 기울였더라면 정보실패를 방지할 수 있었다는 점에서 정책결정자들에게 보다 근본적인 정보실패의 책임이 있었다.
Abstract
This paper is designed to examine the hypothesis that the policy makers, than the intelligence agencies, were more responsible for the intelligence failure at the outbreak of the Korean War. Intelligence failure, more often than not, results from non-intelligence factors such as intelligence disregard and arrogance caused by the decision makers as well as by the intelligence agencies. In this case, it cannot be called intelligence failure but policy failure. Before the start of the Korea War, the intelligence agencies such as CIA, KLO, KMAG had been collecting informations on North Korea. Since early 1948, they had produced various reports, containing warnings on imminent strategic surprise from the north. They also had persistently reported about North Korea’s military build-up. Unfortunately, the reports were regarded as contradictory and inaccurate. Due to lack of scientific intelligence assets in the flood of rumors and disinformation, the agencies could not estimate the exact time of invasion. Eventually, the intelligence agencies were unable to draw up policy changes by failing to gain policy makers’ confidence. But, Intelligence agencies are not also free from the intelligence failure, since they were not successful in drawing the customers’ attention in the absense of Ⅳ. 한국전쟁 발발과 미국 트루먼 행정부의 정보실패_ 151 close consultation efforts. Truman decided to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea and to cut military aid, by underestimating the strategic value of Korean peninsula. Dean Acheson’s speech, excluding Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter, preceded. The policy makers in Washington D.C. were obsessed with the fixed idea that “North Korea is Soviet satellite state, and all-out war will not break out in the peninsula.” They paid little attention to the warnings and did not take any policy action. It is also true that the intelligence failures regarding Korean war were caused by multiple factors, not only by a certain part’s missteps. But if the policy makers didn’t ignore and dump the warnings, intelligence failures could be avoided. That’s why policy makers were more responsible for the intelligence failures.
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