하이데거의 역사성의 의미와 한계

Abstract

This article is to clarify the meaning and limitation of Heidegger’s notion of historicity(Geschichtlichkeit) along with the way Heidegger himself deconstructed the history of Western philosophy. Heidegger once critiqued and deconstructed in Being and Time the notion of historicity based upon commonsensical notion of time, and he attempted to elucidate the meanings of the critique and deconstruction. The basic perspective for his work on this task is Ereignis disclosed upon the horizon of temporality or existential time. However, although he criticized the thoughts of beings on the horizon of the commonsensical time and paved a way for a new horizon of existential thought, Heidegger’s horizon of existential thought lacks questions of moral value for the others. Of course, he mentioned in Letter to Humanism that his own experience of thought is none other than existential experience, in which theory cannot be separated from praxis. Nonetheless, this still does not imply the question of humanistic criteria for value, for which our human beings strive. This is due to his failure to notice the importance of the historical and ethical value and purpose of Ereignis for human being by only focusing on the anticipation of death and by only stressing upon the revelatory feature of the nothingness disclosed through anxiety and the event of being. Heidegger seems to understand ethical questions as those of praxis in contrast with theory. This kind of his understanding of being and history is fundamentally flawed. He just understood historicity only from the perspective of the subjective and existential resolution. As a result, Heidegger is very close to the modern philosophy of the subject.