Sequential Tariffs in Cournot and Bertrand Competition
1
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
We examine the welfare implication of the sequential tariff game between discriminatory and uniform tariff rates in which the importing country imposes tariffs on asymmetric foreign exporters. Under Cournot competition, the importing country has an incentive to manipulate the tariff structure through sequential tariffs. Imposing the sequential uniform tariff improves consumer surplus, as well as social and global welfare, when the cost difference is small. In contrast, under Bertrand competition, the importing country always prefers the simultaneous tariff over the sequential tariff. As a result, the importing country prefers the simultaneous discriminatory tariff to the uniform tariff under Bertrand competition. Moreover, consumer surplus, social and global welfare with the simultaneous discriminatory tariff under Bertrand competition are greater than with the sequential uniform or the discriminatory tariff under Cournot competition.
Abstract
We examine the welfare implication of the sequential tariff game between discriminatory and uniform tariff rates in which the importing country imposes tariffs on asymmetric foreign exporters. Under Cournot competition, the importing country has an incentive to manipulate the tariff structure through sequential tariffs. Imposing the sequential uniform tariff improves consumer surplus, as well as social and global welfare, when the cost difference is small. In contrast, under Bertrand competition, the importing country always prefers the simultaneous tariff over the sequential tariff. As a result, the importing country prefers the simultaneous discriminatory tariff to the uniform tariff under Bertrand competition. Moreover, consumer surplus, social and global welfare with the simultaneous discriminatory tariff under Bertrand competition are greater than with the sequential uniform or the discriminatory tariff under Cournot competition.
참고문헌 (16)
- Brander, J. A., "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry", Journal of International Economics, 18, pp.83~100 (1985)
- Brander, J. A., "Monopolistic Competition and International Trade", pp.194~206 (1984), Oxford University Press
- Choi, J. P., "Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology: Discriminatory tariffs vs. the ‘most favored nation’ clause", Journal of International Economics, 38, pp.143~160 (1995)
- Din, K., "MFN vs tariff discrimination in the presence of cross ownership", Review of International Economics, 24, pp.1149~1166 (2016)
- Gatsios, K., "Preferential tariffs and the ‘most favoured nation’ principle : A note", Journal of International Economics, 28, pp.365~373 (1990)
- Hashimzade, N., "Uniform versus discriminatory tariffs", Review of Development Economics, 15, pp.403~416 (2011)
- Hashimzade, N., "MFN status and the choice of tariff regime", Open Economic Review, 22, pp.847~874 (2011)
- Horiba, Y., "International duopoly, tariff policy and superiority of free trade", Japanese Economic Review, 51, pp.207~220 (2000)
- Hwang, H., "Optimum discriminatory tariffs under oligopolistic competition", Canadian Journal of Economics, 24, pp.693~702 (1991)
- Kim, H., "Price discrimination and sequential contracting in monopolistic input markets", Economics Letters, 128, pp.39~42 (2015)
- Liao, P., "Uniform versus discriminatory tariffs : When will export taxes be used?", Southern Economic Journal, 72, pp.915~925 (2006)
- McAfee, R. P., "Opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting : Nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity", American Economic Review, 84, pp.210~230 (1994)
- Ozerturk, S., "Tariff discrimination versus MFN under incomplete information", Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 14, pp.197~208 (2005)
- Saggi, K., "Tariffs and the most favored nation clause", Journal of International Economics, 63, pp.341~368 (2004)
- Saggi, K., "The MFN Clause, welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size", Journal of Development Economics, 88, pp.132~143 (2009)
- Saggi, K., "An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure", Canadian Journal of Economics, 38, pp.242~254 (2005)