An Experimental Economic Study on the US-EU FTA: A Perspective on Within-Industry Negotiations
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This paper finds implications for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) by experimentally examining how sectors in one country may behave to maximize their benefits while managing a bilateral trade negotiation such as the TTIP with another country. The paper designs two stage games similar to real-world bilateral – negotiations. The first stage involves internal negotiations within countries, and the second stage, external ones between countries. The results imply that an advantageous sector of a country may have to give up potential benefits without exercising any explicit power to extract more benefits through negotiations. In addition, aggressive agenda setting may be useful for more benefits, and delays in external negotiations are not recommended.
Abstract
This paper finds implications for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) by experimentally examining how sectors in one country may behave to maximize their benefits while managing a bilateral trade negotiation such as the TTIP with another country. The paper designs two stage games similar to real-world bilateral – negotiations. The first stage involves internal negotiations within countries, and the second stage, external ones between countries. The results imply that an advantageous sector of a country may have to give up potential benefits without exercising any explicit power to extract more benefits through negotiations. In addition, aggressive agenda setting may be useful for more benefits, and delays in external negotiations are not recommended.
참고문헌 (12)
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