When does fairness and reciprocity hinder multilateral tariff cooperation?
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This study explored how fairness and reciprocity affect multilateral tariff cooperation. Reciprocal countries respond to cooperative behavior with rewards (positive reciprocity) and retaliate against unkind behavior (negative reciprocity). Previous research demonstrates that when the influence of fairness and reciprocity is modest, reciprocity promotes multilateral tariff cooperation, especially when trading partners maintain moderate demands in their commercial policies. However, cooperation is undermined if only liberal import policies are perceived as fair. This study confirms that these dynamics persist even when the impact of fairness and reciprocity is strong. Second, it identifies the conditions under which fairness and reciprocity hinder multilateral tariff cooperation.
Abstract
This study explored how fairness and reciprocity affect multilateral tariff cooperation. Reciprocal countries respond to cooperative behavior with rewards (positive reciprocity) and retaliate against unkind behavior (negative reciprocity). Previous research demonstrates that when the influence of fairness and reciprocity is modest, reciprocity promotes multilateral tariff cooperation, especially when trading partners maintain moderate demands in their commercial policies. However, cooperation is undermined if only liberal import policies are perceived as fair. This study confirms that these dynamics persist even when the impact of fairness and reciprocity is strong. Second, it identifies the conditions under which fairness and reciprocity hinder multilateral tariff cooperation.
참고문헌 (26)
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