Case Study on Ways to Strengthen the ROK-US Space Alliance: Focusing on Cases of Response to the US’s ‘Shooting Down’ of Chinese Reconnaissance Balloons and Suspected Objects
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This article begins with the two critical issues; the perception of threats to the space domain may not be as familiar as the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and then, how to draw up discussions on the Korean peninsula's space security and the space alliance between South Korea and the United States. In particular, under the judgment that it needs to observe whether or not North Korea’s reconnaissance satellite, Great Mirror1, has the capability of accomplishing its mission as an information and communication weapon system, beyond the fact itself that North Korea launched it, the scope of discussion herein will be expanded to the issue of security environment in which South Korea and the United States are confronting North Korea and China. Hereupon, we approach the discussion accordingly, by choosing 'The Case of the US Shoot-Down Response to a Chinese Reconnaissance Balloon', which is a ‘low-cost, high-efficiency’ hybrid threat and the most classical form of reconnaissance and information collection, and Sean Monaghan (2022)'s hypothesis and the 'Framework for Hybrid Threat Suppression' were used to analyze the US response to the most high-altitude 'shoot-down' case in history. As a result, depending on the level of the threat (level 2 → level 3) and the intensity of the threat (high intensity), the United States could implement the option of an absolute deterrence strategy based on the retaliation punishment, which actually led to an order to shoot down. This response from the United States has firstly expanded the conflict between the United States and China to various fields and is expected to further accelerate competition for taking the leadership in the space sector between the two countries and secondly, North Korea's similar provocations and the possibility of implementing its own power generation timeline by taking advantage of the neo-Cold War, and the dependent result and impact of the U.S. response also make us face up to a crisis situation in which we have got to seek countermeasures for space security on the Korean Peninsula. Above all, it is emphasized that the deterrence strategy to strengthen the space alliance within the existing alliance system should be materialized into a more practical and realistic plan in accordance with the recognition of space threats by both South Korea and the United States. To this end, we insist on the need for the military and diplomatic measures between South Korea and the United States on the ‘secrecy policy for space programs’, making an effort to solve the dilemma of ‘restricting and sharing the secrecy of space information’ between allies.
Abstract
This article begins with the two critical issues; the perception of threats to the space domain may not be as familiar as the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and then, how to draw up discussions on the Korean peninsula's space security and the space alliance between South Korea and the United States. In particular, under the judgment that it needs to observe whether or not North Korea’s reconnaissance satellite, Great Mirror1, has the capability of accomplishing its mission as an information and communication weapon system, beyond the fact itself that North Korea launched it, the scope of discussion herein will be expanded to the issue of security environment in which South Korea and the United States are confronting North Korea and China. Hereupon, we approach the discussion accordingly, by choosing 'The Case of the US Shoot-Down Response to a Chinese Reconnaissance Balloon', which is a ‘low-cost, high-efficiency’ hybrid threat and the most classical form of reconnaissance and information collection, and Sean Monaghan (2022)'s hypothesis and the 'Framework for Hybrid Threat Suppression' were used to analyze the US response to the most high-altitude 'shoot-down' case in history. As a result, depending on the level of the threat (level 2 → level 3) and the intensity of the threat (high intensity), the United States could implement the option of an absolute deterrence strategy based on the retaliation punishment, which actually led to an order to shoot down. This response from the United States has firstly expanded the conflict between the United States and China to various fields and is expected to further accelerate competition for taking the leadership in the space sector between the two countries and secondly, North Korea's similar provocations and the possibility of implementing its own power generation timeline by taking advantage of the neo-Cold War, and the dependent result and impact of the U.S. response also make us face up to a crisis situation in which we have got to seek countermeasures for space security on the Korean Peninsula. Above all, it is emphasized that the deterrence strategy to strengthen the space alliance within the existing alliance system should be materialized into a more practical and realistic plan in accordance with the recognition of space threats by both South Korea and the United States. To this end, we insist on the need for the military and diplomatic measures between South Korea and the United States on the ‘secrecy policy for space programs’, making an effort to solve the dilemma of ‘restricting and sharing the secrecy of space information’ between allies.
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