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How could decentralization of India promote public goods delivery?

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국제학연구소 (The Keimyung Institute for International Studies)|2023.06|국제학논총 (JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES)|제37권 |pp. 35-68|DOI 10.22971/jois.37..202306.35

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키워드

공공재India인도분권화DecentralizationCorruption부패Public GoodsParty competition정당 간 경쟁

초록

Decentralization requires a particular condition to function, especially when initial endowment is less favorable. The sceptics of decentralization argued that it hinders public goods delivery by incentivizing subnational government to behave opportunistic. Considering that a lack of local public good is a sign of ineffective decentralization, I found the vertical party competition produces a better policy outcome. My statistical analysis shows that the competition between national and regional parties commit incumbents to produce local public goods. But horizontal competition between regional parties incentivize the regional agents to coordinate one another to expand a common pool of rent. And it necessarily lowers the incentives to provide local public goods. I analyzed the Indian states from 2004 to 2020 with random effects model. Finally, the result is consistent to my hypotheses.

Abstract

Decentralization requires a particular condition to function, especially when initial endowment is less favorable. The sceptics of decentralization argued that it hinders public goods delivery by incentivizing subnational government to behave opportunistic. Considering that a lack of local public good is a sign of ineffective decentralization, I found the vertical party competition produces a better policy outcome. My statistical analysis shows that the competition between national and regional parties commit incumbents to produce local public goods. But horizontal competition between regional parties incentivize the regional agents to coordinate one another to expand a common pool of rent. And it necessarily lowers the incentives to provide local public goods. I analyzed the Indian states from 2004 to 2020 with random effects model. Finally, the result is consistent to my hypotheses.

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