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1592년 일본의 조선 침략에 대한柳成龍의 시각과 대응

Viewpoints and Countermeasures by Seoae Ryu Seong-ryongon the Japanese Invasion against the Joseon in 1592

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This writing is to identify the understanding of Ryu Seong-ryong(柳成龍) through his viewpoints on the opinion of Japanese aggression on the Joseon Dynasty, assessment of Japanese troops, and peace negotiations with Japan. Ryu Seong-ryong regarded the possibility of Japanese aggression against Joseon before Japanese Invasion against the Joseon in 1592 as a matter of low. As for the Japanese situation, he knew that Toyotomi Hidoyoshi(豊臣秀吉) brought the country under a single authority but was unaware of details such as the process of his coming into power. Ryu Seong-ryong believed that Japan invaded the Joseon in order to invade Ming, China. He argued that the Joseon should learn the strong points of Japanese Forces because he thought the Joseon was defeated at the earlier part of the war due to the insufficience of Joseon in preparation, the surprise attack by the Japan, and Japan’s overwhelming against the Joseon. After the recovery of Pyeongyangseong(平壤城), however, he began to change his viewpoints on Japanese Forces, and rated Japanese Forces low by pointing out the defects in tactics of Japan, being confident that Joseon could defeat Japan. Ryu Seong-ryong definitely had opposed peace negotiations with Japan because he believed that the diplomatic position of Joseon would be attenuated in the future and complete extermination of Japan would be impossible when Joseon could not participate in the peace negotiations. However, he later changed his ground to support the peace negotiations with Japan because he recognized that the negotiations could not be refused after Ming, China wanted the peace with Japan. He attempted to reconsolidate the preparedness of the Joseon Forces by obeying the Ming’s demands and gaining time. In fact, while the peace negotiations were being in progress, Joseon increased armaments such as manufacturing various weapons, repairing castle walls, introducing Jeolgang Strategy(浙江兵法), creating Hulryeondogam(訓練都監), converting into Jingwan System(鎭管體制), and ensuring provisions, following Ryu’s conceptions. Owing to this military strengthening, the Japanese Forces failed to go north and had to stayed on the southern coast when they invaded Joseon again in 1597. Ryu Seong-ryong might bring the Joseon to collapse by his misjudgement because he was charged with affairs of state during the war. This is why he should be careful in performing every affair, and it is safe to say that his policy toward Japan was considerably realistic.

Abstract

This writing is to identify the understanding of Ryu Seong-ryong(柳成龍) through his viewpoints on the opinion of Japanese aggression on the Joseon Dynasty, assessment of Japanese troops, and peace negotiations with Japan. Ryu Seong-ryong regarded the possibility of Japanese aggression against Joseon before Japanese Invasion against the Joseon in 1592 as a matter of low. As for the Japanese situation, he knew that Toyotomi Hidoyoshi(豊臣秀吉) brought the country under a single authority but was unaware of details such as the process of his coming into power. Ryu Seong-ryong believed that Japan invaded the Joseon in order to invade Ming, China. He argued that the Joseon should learn the strong points of Japanese Forces because he thought the Joseon was defeated at the earlier part of the war due to the insufficience of Joseon in preparation, the surprise attack by the Japan, and Japan’s overwhelming against the Joseon. After the recovery of Pyeongyangseong(平壤城), however, he began to change his viewpoints on Japanese Forces, and rated Japanese Forces low by pointing out the defects in tactics of Japan, being confident that Joseon could defeat Japan. Ryu Seong-ryong definitely had opposed peace negotiations with Japan because he believed that the diplomatic position of Joseon would be attenuated in the future and complete extermination of Japan would be impossible when Joseon could not participate in the peace negotiations. However, he later changed his ground to support the peace negotiations with Japan because he recognized that the negotiations could not be refused after Ming, China wanted the peace with Japan. He attempted to reconsolidate the preparedness of the Joseon Forces by obeying the Ming’s demands and gaining time. In fact, while the peace negotiations were being in progress, Joseon increased armaments such as manufacturing various weapons, repairing castle walls, introducing Jeolgang Strategy(浙江兵法), creating Hulryeondogam(訓練都監), converting into Jingwan System(鎭管體制), and ensuring provisions, following Ryu’s conceptions. Owing to this military strengthening, the Japanese Forces failed to go north and had to stayed on the southern coast when they invaded Joseon again in 1597. Ryu Seong-ryong might bring the Joseon to collapse by his misjudgement because he was charged with affairs of state during the war. This is why he should be careful in performing every affair, and it is safe to say that his policy toward Japan was considerably realistic.

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