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나중에 상장폐지된 기업을 감사한 파트너의 감사품질이 더 낮은가? “연좌제” 또는“놀란 가슴” 여부에 대한 실증증거

Audit Quality of the Partners Who Audit Subsequently Delisted Companies Is Lower? Evidence on “Guilt-by Association” or “Scalded Cats”

이재은|이중현|최우정
한국공인회계사회 (THE KOREAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS)|2018.09|회계ㆍ세무와 감사 연구 (Study on Accounting, Taxation & Auditing)|제60권 제3호|pp. 1-45|DOI 10.22781/kicpa.2018.60.3.1

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연좌제전염효과contagion effect감사품질audit quality.파트너 이름 공개상장폐지기업partner name disclosuredelisted company“guilt-by association”
주제분류회계학

초록

2018 회계연도부터 시행된 개정 회계감사기준에 따른 상장기업 감사파트너 이름공개 제도는, 이 제도가 감사투명성을 높일 것이라는 논리에 근거한다. 즉 파트너 과거 감사경력을 살펴보면 그 파트너의 감사품질을 예상할 수 있다는 것으로서, 문제기업을 담당한 파트너는 다른 감사에서도 문제가 있을 수 있다고 추정한다. 그러나 유능한 파트너일수록 문제기업을 더 많이 담당할 수 있으므로 이러한 논리에 잘못된 “연좌제” 위험이 있을 수도 있다. 오히려 해당 파트너가 문제기업의 높은 감사위험을 미리 인지하고, 경각심 때문에 다른 기업 감사도 철저하게 하는 “긍정적 전염효과” 가능성까지도 있다. 상장폐지 위험이 높은 기업은 감사실패 위험도 높지만, 동시에 상장폐지를 초래할 수 있는 의견거절 등 감사의견에 대한 반발로 회계사들이 실제로 신변위협을 느낄 수도 있기 때문이다. 이러한 상반된 가능성을 고려하여, 본 연구는 나중에 상장폐지된 기업을 감사한 파트너의 감사품질(상장폐지 기업은 제외)이 다른 파트너들과 차이가 있는지 조사한다. 구체적으로, 본 연구는 나중에 상장폐지된 기업을 감사한 파트너의 감사품질이 더 낮은지 여부와 다른 기업 감사에 대한 긍정적 “전염효과” 측면에 초점을 맞춘다. 실증조사 결과, 나중에 상장폐지된 기업을 감사한 파트너가 담당한 다른 기업들의 실적대응재량발생액(절댓값)은 유의한 차이가 없으나, 양과 음의 재량발생액 표본을 구분한 분석결과에서는 음의 재량발생액 크기가 유의하게 증가함을 발견하였다. 파트너 담당 상장폐지기업의 복수 여부를 추가 고려한 분석과 해당 감사연도에 관리종목기업을 담당한 파트너인지 여부에 대한 결합효과를 조사한 결과도 동일하였다. 이 추정결과들은 기업특성을 통제한 성향대응표본과 감사인규모에 따른 표본 분류 등 추가분석 결과에서도 유사하다. 위 실증결과는 나중에 상장폐지된 기업을 감사한 파트너가 더 보수적이고, 특히 복수 상장폐지기업을 감사한 파트너와 관리종목 담당 파트너가 더 큰 이익조정 억제 현상을 보였다는 점에서, 문제기업 감사파트너에 대한 잘못된 연좌제 위험과 파트너 차원의 높은 위험기업 감사경험에 따른 긍정적 전염효과 주장을 뒷받침하는 실증증거이다.

Abstract

This paper examines whether audit partner’s past career associated with problematic clients indicates individual partner’s reputation. We investigate “guilt-by association” by exploring whether audit quality of partners who have audited subsequently delisted companies is different from the others’. Recent changes in U.S. and international audit standards require audit partner name disclosure for public companies. Fergenon (2013) supports partner name disclosure requirement, saying that by identifying the types of companies the audit partner has been responsible for in the past, it could predict what the partner's audit quality would be. Intuitively, it could be argued that the company having management and/or financial problems, usually accompanying accounting problems, may be results of the low audit quality in the past. Therefore, audit quality of the other audit clients that have been audited by the partners who were responsible for audits of the troubled companies may be lower than the others’. Similarly, Wang et al. (2015) reported empirical evidence that the quality of partner’s past audits measured using historical error correction rates relates to the quality of future audits. However, some suggest that this could be misleading. e.g. on the PCAOB’s proposal of partner name disclosure, Ernst and Young (2009) submitted a statement that “...We are concerned that third parties may begin to trade on information about engagement partners without any ability to discern any correlation with audit quality. Providing the name of the engagement partner may risk a simple ‘guilt-by association’ conclusion in certain circumstances. ....If a partner is repeatedly tasked with handling the toughest audit engagements, the public may gain an inaccurate impression of the partner due to a perception of guilt-by-association with companies with financial reporting difficulties. ....” This argument implies that depending on the partner's past audit results, available through disclosure of partner names, some might improperly assess the partner's audit quality because of a false “guilt-by association.” As a result, the willingness of audit partners to serve as the engagement partners for certain audit clients might wane. If these risks are raised, no one may want to take over the audit of the troubled company in the accounting firm as a result. Similarly, Lambert et al. (2018) stated that after the release of partner names, the behavior of the partners was subject to significant changes in response to personal inducements and the quality of the auditors. Delisted companies are largely associated with management problems and accounting frauds. Specifically, in many cases, delisted companies have been involved in the moral hazard of their managers, the corruption and embezzlement of executives, and the implicit accounting fraud controversy. Owing to these severe business or accounting problems that are often exposed together, a delisting company is considered a leading problem companies in the stock markets. The higher delisting risks, the higher chances of earnings management to avoid the delisting (Son and Yeom 2013). Moreover, if the delisting occurs, the auditors are likely to be associated with the risk that auditors could be involved in lawsuits to recover delisting damages or special supervisory reviews of the Financial Supervisory Service. On the other hand, however, it could be argued that the partners who has experienced a high risk audits may perform the audits more rigorously because of bad experience of difficult audit works. Specifically, with respect to the companies that are highly likely to be delisted, partners are nervous about not only the risk of intentional accounting fraud but also physical security threats. This indicates that partner who has been involved in the subsequently delisted company audits, there may be positive “contagion effects” on their audit quality of other companies because it alerts them to the risks in existence (“scalded cat”). Taking the above view into account, we investigate whether the audit quality of the partner auditing subsequently delisted companies is actually lower or higher. We focus on the double-sided views with respect to audit quality of the delisted company audit partners (i.e. guilt-by association vs. scalded cat effects) in the viewpoint of this experienced audit partner's behaviors. Results of this study show that there is no significant difference in quality of partner’s whose clients have been subsequent delisted, as compared with those who have no delisted clients. Rather, delisted client partner’s negative discretionary accruals were significantly larger. This indicates that the partners recognize the higher risks prior to actual delisting which lead to a more conservative audits on other clients like a “scalded cat”. When the delisted companies are plural, the absolute discretionary accruals of the partner’s audit clients are significantly lower. This implies that the partner experiencing multiple potential delists, tends to decrease magnitude of positive and overly negative discretionary accruals. Such results are profound in the clients of partners who audits capital market control clients. This results are generally consistent in several additional tests. The findings have regulatory implications in Korea considering mandatory audit partner name disclosure since the result shows that it is necessary to carefully document empirical evidences on information effects of audit partner identity.

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