환경윤리학에서의 내재적 가치 -존 오닐(John O’Neill)의 논의를 중심으로-

Abstract

Environmental ethics is largely divided into anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. The former recognizes intrinsic value only to human beings and gives only instrumental value to other beings. On the other hand, the latter insists on giving intrinsic value to non-human beings. In this way, the term intrinsic value is acting as an important keyword in the discussion of environmental ethics. In this paper, we examine the question of how to justify the claim of environmental ethics that non-human beings in the natural world also have intrinsic value. The above question can be divided into the following three. The first is what the term intrinsic value specifically means, and the second is whether it can be recognized that non-human beings have objective intrinsic value. And finally, the question is whether we can derive a legitimate moral obligations from it, if we recognize objective intrinsic value to non-human beings. In this paper, I examine the above three issues based on John O'Neill's discussion.