환경의 본래적 가치에 대한 비판과 옹호 논의

Abstract

Many environmentalists take the concept of intrinsic value to be very important in environmental ethics. The purpose of this paper is to examine several important issues regarding intrinsic value, and also to investigate the role intrinsic value may play in the preservation and conservation of environment. If environment is intrinsically valuable, it seems that we have to treasure environment. Thus environment theorists who want to provide solid ground for environmental protection have investigated such characteristics of intrinsic value as its sense, source, locus and role. But it has turned out that providing conclusive answers for these issues is not so easy. For that reason, recently some theorists have argued that we should give up talk of intrinsic value for a pragmatic conception of value. In this new movement, on the one hand, Anthony Weston and Bryan Norton, who call themselves environmental pragmatists, want to replace intrinsic value theories with the so-called 'ecology of values' and 'weak anthropocentrism'. On the other hand, Ben A. Minteer and J. Baird Callicott, who belong to another group of environmental pragmatism, want to revive the role of intrinsic value in environmental ethics by defending it by appealing to its instrumental role or its pragmatic power and promise. Another recent approach is Katie McShane's view. He insists that ethical theory in general and environmental ethics in particular shouldn't give up on the concept of intrinsic value, and he suggests interpreting intrinsic value as a 'distinctive way to care about a thing'. In this paper, after examining various theories mentioned above, I argue that we need to rectify the misunderstandings with intrinsic value, and also to develop our discourse on intrinsic value.