미국의 감청제도에 관한 연구

Abstract

The U.S. intercept system is described by dividing it into the concept, purpose, object and scope of intercept, the requirements and procedures for intercept, and the obligation of cooperation of telecommunications carriers focus on the TITLE Ⅲ in this paper. There is no significant difference between Korea and the United States in the essential identity of intercept, which is the acquisition of real-time communication contents without the consent of the communication party. But the fact that the United States includes oral communication as a subject of intercept is clearly different from our legal system, which excludes it. In terms of the scope of intercept, similar to our real-time intercept, the United States required the contemproneous requirement, showing no difference in the grand scheme of things, but there were clear differences in procedures and requirements depending on the purpose of intercept. In particular, although Korea maintained somewhat stricter intercept requirements than the United States, the United States' post-eavesdropping control system for intercept was more systematic than ours. In addition, we judged that there was room for improvement in that the intercept period was rather long and that intercept was possible even for relatively minor crimes. And the United States has regulations on the business operator's obligation to cooperate in technical measures, etc., and with regard to whether to introduce it, it was also stated that there is a need to review Korea's circumstances and consider introducing it. In addition to the technical standards for intercept, the United States is evaluated to have its own judicial standards for the possibility and management of intercept depending on the purpose and subject of intercept. In contrast, Korea regulates intercept with only a few provisions, such as the Protection Communications Secrets Act and the Act on Counter-Terrorism for The Protection of Citizens and Public Security, leaving room for controversy and interpretation in its application. There is a need to create our own intercept standards for national security and investigations in line with the current reality of increasing conflict in Northeast Asia and changes in the economic landscape represented by so-called technological hegemony. I hope this paper contributes to that.