게임이론을 활용한 임대형 스마트팜 임대료 결정 및 비용분담 메커니즘 분석- Leader-Follower Model과 Shapley Value의 적용을 중심으로 -
Analysis of Rent Determination and Cost Allocation Mechanisms in Rental-Based Smart Farms Using Game Theory - Application of the Leader-Follower Model and the Shapley Value -
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The rental-based smart farm policy has emerged as an important policy tool to increase agricultural productivity and lower entry barriers for young farmers. However, the long-term sustainability of this policy depends on the economic efficiency and fairness of the rent determination and operating cost allocation mechanisms. In this study, we apply a game theoretical model to analyze the strategic interactions and distributional effects of cost-sharing mechanisms in local government rent setting. We use the Stackelberg competition model to derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) to evaluate how a leader municipality influences the pricing strategies of its followers. Additionally, we apply Shapley Valueto evaluate the efficiency and fairness of cooperative cost-sharing versus traditional equal-sharing methods. Empirical analysis using panel data, structural equation modeling (SEM), and data from Korean municipalities (e.g., Gimje, Sangju, and Goheung) confirms that rent setting follows a Stackelberg equilibrium, where the leading municipality significantly influences the responses of the following municipalities. Additionally, Shapley value-based cost allocation reduces farmers' financial burden by 10% and increases policy acceptance by 0.38 points compared to the equal distribution system. This study advances existing research by integrating a game-theoretic framework to optimize rent setting and cost-sharing mechanisms, and provides practical policy recommendations to enhance the sustainability of public agricultural infrastructure and farmer participation.
Abstract
The rental-based smart farm policy has emerged as an important policy tool to increase agricultural productivity and lower entry barriers for young farmers. However, the long-term sustainability of this policy depends on the economic efficiency and fairness of the rent determination and operating cost allocation mechanisms. In this study, we apply a game theoretical model to analyze the strategic interactions and distributional effects of cost-sharing mechanisms in local government rent setting. We use the Stackelberg competition model to derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) to evaluate how a leader municipality influences the pricing strategies of its followers. Additionally, we apply Shapley Valueto evaluate the efficiency and fairness of cooperative cost-sharing versus traditional equal-sharing methods. Empirical analysis using panel data, structural equation modeling (SEM), and data from Korean municipalities (e.g., Gimje, Sangju, and Goheung) confirms that rent setting follows a Stackelberg equilibrium, where the leading municipality significantly influences the responses of the following municipalities. Additionally, Shapley value-based cost allocation reduces farmers' financial burden by 10% and increases policy acceptance by 0.38 points compared to the equal distribution system. This study advances existing research by integrating a game-theoretic framework to optimize rent setting and cost-sharing mechanisms, and provides practical policy recommendations to enhance the sustainability of public agricultural infrastructure and farmer participation.