제2차 인도ㆍ파키스탄 전쟁 이후의 대립관계에 관한 연구: Kashmir문제를 중심으로

Abstract

This paper seeks to examine the origins and aspects of the second Kashmir war and the insurgency of the next generation. One of the reasons leading to the persistent endeavors of the accession of Kashmir to India was derived from Jawaharlal Nehru's emotional attachment to the homeland of his ancestors, the valley of Kashmir. This was solidified by his friendship with Sheikh Abdullah, the nationalist leader of Kashmiris. The national ideology which the leaders of new India aspired for was to build up a strong secular state on the Indian sub-continent. As one of the integral parts of Indian Union, Kashmir should be formed India's only Muslim majority state. The emphasis on secularism led to require a strong centralized state to protect the so called minorities, Muslims etc. There has been no hope that the plebiscite would be held in Kashmir. As a prerequisite of the plebiscite, India has asked Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the occupied territory. Pakistan's denial to vacate the territory gave India the excuse to betray its commitment to hold a plebiscite. Pakistan's irredentist claim to Kashmir has led its leaders to provide support to the insurgency in the valley. Pakistan launched a careful attempt to stir a rebellion of centrifugal forces in the valley in the wake of Nehru's death. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed that the potential for disintegration in India was great on an unprecedented scale. Pakistani leadership reached a fundamentally flawed inference that the Rann of Kutch conflict came to expose to the weakness of Indian army. The Rann of Kutch affair undoubtedly encouraged Pakistan government in their assessment that the Indian army, suffering from the aftermath of its defeat by the Chinese, was inferior to Pakistani military forces. This incorrect supposition stimulated their decision to foment a rebellion in Kashmir. Pakistan believed that, once infiltrating their militants into the valley, the discontent native peoples would support the invasion and instigate a mass uprising against Indian rule. But the cooperation of the local population with the infiltrators proved to be an abortive end. Pakistan had launched its strategies of engaging a proxy war in Kashmir through the spread of militancy. Various aspects of spontaneous and voluntary insurgency, intifada activities, had been overflowed throughout the valley during early 1990s. A number of significant militant groups, including JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen, had begun to operate acts of rally, sabotages, strikes, attacks on bridges and government offices, murder of key officers, kidnapping of prominent persons, suicide bombings etc. Every youth in Kashmir came to be regarded as a potential militant. Their objectives were either complete independence of Kashmir or unification with Pakistan. Attacks by militants on specific targets, reprisals by the government, cordon and search operations to flush out militants and find weapons had become daily happenings. The militants hoped that the repression of the Indian authorities in the valley would attract international attention. Kargil offensive of Pakistani militants appeared to be the characteristics of a well-planned military operation for cutting off the trunk road between Srinagar and Leh. Throughout the Indian suppression against the infiltrators in Kargil, Pakistan called on the United Nations and great powers to assist in a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The fear of the Kargil war between India and Pakistan with strategic nuclear weapons renewed international interest and concern in the Kashmir conflict. The Kargil war showed that although strategic nuclear weapons have much greater power, India and Pakistan, nuclear powers, were forced to put through a credible conventional warfare. Strategic nuclear weapons with the terrible power of mutual destruction proved us that they can be used not for actual fighting but only for strategic purpose.