중국 국유기업 반독점 규제에 관한 고찰
A Study on State-owned Enterprise Regulation in Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China
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There has been a general consensus about the need of reform of state-owned enterprises in China. However, the opinions of details such as direction, velocity and method, are sharply divided. In the standpoint of a competition policy, it is rated that the reform of state-owned enterprises incited the Chinese market to generate cartel, misuses of dominant position and unfair trades. Moreover, inseparate government functions from enterprise management made hard to differentiate the concept of administrative act from action by state-owned enterprises, and these actions were intermingled to prevent strict enforcement of the antitrust law. There were only a little expect that the problem of administrative monopoly would get solved by the antitrust law, even at the time of enactment. It was merely expected that antitrust would provide a symbolic value with reducing administrative monopoly. But problems of antitrust were indicated in legal responsibility dealing with administrative monopoly, and the law was almost never been enforced in that field. Therefore, this kind of regulation could provide a legal shelter to administrative monopoly, when regulating behaviors of state-owned enterprises with antitrust law. Market behavior of state-owned enterprises should be regulated strictly as a monopolistic behavior. But, I think that Enforcing the regulation of state-own enterprise’s independent action as cartel and misuses of dominant position isn't impossible. Social needs in enterprise management has been increased, because the old dissatisfactions such as high-price and low-grade services in oligopolistic market of state-owned enterprises had been accumulated. Regulatory agencies must differentiate naturally occurred- from political monopolistic market, and actively enforce the antitrust to resolve the monopolistic structure of state-owned enterprise. This would be the prerequisite of harmonic development in structure and forms of China market.
Abstract
There has been a general consensus about the need of reform of state-owned enterprises in China. However, the opinions of details such as direction, velocity and method, are sharply divided. In the standpoint of a competition policy, it is rated that the reform of state-owned enterprises incited the Chinese market to generate cartel, misuses of dominant position and unfair trades. Moreover, inseparate government functions from enterprise management made hard to differentiate the concept of administrative act from action by state-owned enterprises, and these actions were intermingled to prevent strict enforcement of the antitrust law. There were only a little expect that the problem of administrative monopoly would get solved by the antitrust law, even at the time of enactment. It was merely expected that antitrust would provide a symbolic value with reducing administrative monopoly. But problems of antitrust were indicated in legal responsibility dealing with administrative monopoly, and the law was almost never been enforced in that field. Therefore, this kind of regulation could provide a legal shelter to administrative monopoly, when regulating behaviors of state-owned enterprises with antitrust law. Market behavior of state-owned enterprises should be regulated strictly as a monopolistic behavior. But, I think that Enforcing the regulation of state-own enterprise’s independent action as cartel and misuses of dominant position isn't impossible. Social needs in enterprise management has been increased, because the old dissatisfactions such as high-price and low-grade services in oligopolistic market of state-owned enterprises had been accumulated. Regulatory agencies must differentiate naturally occurred- from political monopolistic market, and actively enforce the antitrust to resolve the monopolistic structure of state-owned enterprise. This would be the prerequisite of harmonic development in structure and forms of China market.
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