Some Comparative Statics Of Entry In Markets With Demand Complementarities
1
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper develops a two-market Cournot model with complementary demands to investigate comparative statics associated with symmetric and asymmetric entry. Notably, while market prices are decreasing with the number of market rivals, asymmetric entry actually causes prices to rise in the adjacent, complementary market. In addition, the price-decreasing effects of symmetric entry are attenuated with strong cross-price effects.
Abstract
This paper develops a two-market Cournot model with complementary demands to investigate comparative statics associated with symmetric and asymmetric entry. Notably, while market prices are decreasing with the number of market rivals, asymmetric entry actually causes prices to rise in the adjacent, complementary market. In addition, the price-decreasing effects of symmetric entry are attenuated with strong cross-price effects.
참고문헌 (10)
- Bulow, J., "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements", Journal of Political Economy, 93(3), pp.488~511 (1985)
- How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry?: Evidence from Major Airlines, "Goolsbee, A.", ~, pp.NBER Working Paper 11072 (2005)
- Liebowitz, S. J, "Network Eects. in Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, In Martin Cave, Sumit Majumdar, and Ingo Vogelsang", pp.75~96 (2002), Amsterdam
- Yuanzhu Lu, "Competition in Dual Markets: Two Game-Theoretical Models on Pricing in Online versus Multiple Channels", Journal of Economic Research (JER), 14(2), pp.129~150 (2009), 경제연구소
- Morrison, S., "Actual, Adjacent, and Potential Competition", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 35, pp.239~256 (2001)
- Okuguchi, K., "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly, Oligopsony and Oligopsonistic Oligopoly", Journal of Economic Research, 5, pp.173~187 (2000)
- Taylor, L, "Telecommunications Demand in Theory and Practice" (1994), Kluwer Academic
- Tirole, J, "The Theory of Industrial Organization" (1988), MIT Press
- Weisman, D. L., "A Generalized Pricing Rule for Multi-Market Cournot Oligopoly", Economics Letters, 81(1), pp.95~99 (2003)
- Weisman, D. L., "Market Concentration, Multi-Market Participation and Mergers in Network Industries", Review of Network Economics, 4(2), pp.129~141 (2005)