THE COMPARISON OF ENTRY DETERRENCE BETWEEN COURNOT AND BERTRAND COMPETITION
1
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
We compare the incentive of an incumbent monopolist to deter the entry between Cournot and Bertrand competition in differentiated product markets. It is first shown that unless the products are perfect substitutes, the incumbent can block the entry more easily under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. For the entry deterrence, as long as the products are differentiated to some degree, like the blockaded entry, the incumbent would like to deter the entry more under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. However, if the product differentiation is quite small, the incumbent can deter the entry more easily under Bertrand competition than in the Cournot competition.
Abstract
We compare the incentive of an incumbent monopolist to deter the entry between Cournot and Bertrand competition in differentiated product markets. It is first shown that unless the products are perfect substitutes, the incumbent can block the entry more easily under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. For the entry deterrence, as long as the products are differentiated to some degree, like the blockaded entry, the incumbent would like to deter the entry more under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. However, if the product differentiation is quite small, the incumbent can deter the entry more easily under Bertrand competition than in the Cournot competition.
참고문헌 (12)
- Bain, "Barriers to New Competition Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries" (1956), Harvard University Press
- Bulow, "Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry", pp.178~182 (1985)
- Cheng, "Rand Journal of Economics", pp.146~152 (1885)
- Dastidar, K, "Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a Homogeneous Product Market", 75, pp.205~212 (1997)
- A, "A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers The Bell Journal of Economics", pp.20~32 (1979)
- A, "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence", pp.95~106 (1980)
- Roberts, "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information", eco(metrica), pp.443~460 (1982)
- "New Developments on the Oligopoly Front Journal of Political Economy", pp.215~235 (1958)
- "Equilibrium Prices in the Bertrand and Cournot Oligopolies Journal of Economic Theory", pp.128~139 (1987)
- Singh, "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly Rand Journal of Economics", pp.546~554 (1984)
- No, "Bell Journal of Economics" (1977)
- Vives, "On the Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria with Product Differentiation Journal of Economic Theory", pp.166~175 (1985)