Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Managerial Delegation: A Quadratic Cost Case
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This paper analyzes the endogenous timing problems in various mixed duopolistic industries with managerial delegation, where the technology of each firm is represented by a quadratic cost function. We show that in price competition, the equilibrium result is unique and unchanged with respect to the cost function type, whereas in quantity competition, we obtain the result that the equilibrium may be unique and then the public firm tends to become the follower.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the endogenous timing problems in various mixed duopolistic industries with managerial delegation, where the technology of each firm is represented by a quadratic cost function. We show that in price competition, the equilibrium result is unique and unchanged with respect to the cost function type, whereas in quantity competition, we obtain the result that the equilibrium may be unique and then the public firm tends to become the follower.
참고문헌 (21)
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