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Analysis of Management Performance Change of Korean Agricultural Co-operatives around CEO turnover

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This paper aims to determine whether the changes in management performance of domestic agricultural cooperatives had an effect on the election results of Korean Agricultural Cooperatives in 2015. Financial performance data (2012-2015) prior to the Nation-wide Cooperatives elections in 2015 were reviewed to determine the impact of the election outcome on the election results. 2SLS Probit regression analysis shows that the significant parameters for incumbent president turnover in the 2015 election were the candidates’ age, net profit decrease in 2014, and ROA comparison to similar asset-size group. These results support the conclusion that the union members of KAC consider whether the age of president is over 60, whether the net profits of the cooperatives are worse than the previous year, and compare the results of similar groups’ managerial performance (ROA).

Abstract

This paper aims to determine whether the changes in management performance of domestic agricultural cooperatives had an effect on the election results of Korean Agricultural Cooperatives in 2015. Financial performance data (2012-2015) prior to the Nation-wide Cooperatives elections in 2015 were reviewed to determine the impact of the election outcome on the election results. 2SLS Probit regression analysis shows that the significant parameters for incumbent president turnover in the 2015 election were the candidates’ age, net profit decrease in 2014, and ROA comparison to similar asset-size group. These results support the conclusion that the union members of KAC consider whether the age of president is over 60, whether the net profits of the cooperatives are worse than the previous year, and compare the results of similar groups’ managerial performance (ROA).

참고문헌 (26)

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