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외환위기이후 한국기업에서 사외이사제도의 도입에 관한 연구

Analysis of Outside Director Introduction After the Currency Crisis

김주태
한국산업경영학회 (Korean Association Of Industrial Business Administrarion)|2004.08|경영연구 (Journal of Business Research)|제19권 제3호|pp. 157-187

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키워드

사외이사지배구조Outside Director외환위기Currency CrisisGovernance Structure
주제분류경영학

초록

경영전략의 분야에서 지배구조에 관한 연구의 중요성에 비하여, 이사회에 관한 연구는 많으나, 사외이사에 관한 모델을 제시하는 연구는 거의 없다. 지배구조 개혁의 중심인 이사회의 개혁은 주로 사외이사의 역할의 증대를 통해서 이루고자 하므로, 전 세계적으로 중요성이 있는 지배구조 개혁에 관한 연구에서 사외이사제도의 연구는 매우 의미가 있을 것이다. 이 논문의 목적은 외환위기이후 한국기업에 사외이사제도가 얼마나 적극적으로 도입되었는가를 조사하는 것이다. 적극적인 도입정도를 분석하기 위하여 독립성, 정보제공, 보상의 세 가지 조건을 제시하였다. 즉, 사외이사는 잘 활동하기 위하여 경영자로부터 독립적이고, 내부정보를 효율적으로 제공받아야 하며, 적절한 보상을 받아야 한다는 것이다. 사외이사제도의 도입에 영향을 미치는 결정요인은 전략연구에서 기업의 경쟁우위의 원천에 대하여 설명하는 ser-M체계에 따라 경영자, 환경, 자원의 세 분야에서 모색되었다. 한국기업에서 사외이사제도의 도입과 관련하여 경영자의 개혁성(나이, 재임기간, 대주주 지분율), 산업의 수익성, 내부특성(기업규모, 부채비율, 과거의 성과)의 변수들이 사외이사의 도입에 미치는 영향이 분석되었다. 한국의 상장 제조업체를 대상으로 2000년도를 기준으로 실증 분석한 결과 사외이사제도 도입의 적극성은 기업규모, 부채비율과는 정의 관계를 보여주었으며, 대주주의 지분율과는 부의 관계를 보여주었고, 과거의 성과는 혼합된 결과를 보여주었다. 결과적으로, 외환위기이후 한국 기업 중에는 기업규모가 클수록, 부채비율이 높을수록, 그리고 대주주의 지분율이 낮을수록 사외이사를 더 적극적인 자세로 효율적으로 도입하고자 노력한 것으로 분석되었다.

Abstract

There have been many researches about governance structure, but there are few researches about outside director in strategic management. As the role of outside directors in board of directors is increasing, outside director system is an important area in strategic management research. The objective of this research is to analyze what conditions are required for the effective introduction of outside director system and what factors influence the effective introduction in Korean companies after the currency crisis. Three conditions for the effective introduction are found out, independence, information and compensation. Outside directors need to be independent from the management, be supplied with the internal information and be compensated properly. The factors influencing the effective introduction are searched in related with management, environments and resources which are three main sources of competitive advantage in strategic management research from ser-M framework. We hypothesize the relationship between the introduction and CEO innovativeness which are measured by age, tenure and large shareholder ownership, industry profitability, and internal characteristics measured by sales, debt ratio and past performance. As a result of empirical analysis with Korean manufacturing firms listed in Korean stock exchange, we have found positive relationship with sales and debt ratio, negative relationship with large shareholder ownership and mixed result with past performance.

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