샌프란시스코 대일강화회의와 한국의 참가문제 - 한국의 내재적(內在的) 요인과 그 영향 -
The San Francisco Peace Conference and the Issue of the Republic of Korea's Participation - Internal Factors to obstruct the Korea's Participation-
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The Republic of Korea had tried to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference in order to get reparations for the damages and losses under the Japanese colonial rule within the multilateral framework, to resolve the bilateral issues with Japan on the basis of the Peace Treaty, and to foster its status in the international community as a member of democratic countries. However, it failed to do so. Most of the advanced researches to study on the factors that blocked Korea's participation in the Conference are focused on the external ones, such as opposition by the U. S. A and the U. K. who refused to recognize the Korea's status as an Allied Power, and the change of the U. S. government's postwar policy toward Japan, which conflicted with Korea's strong demand for reparations from Japan. The purpose of this paper is to examine the Korea's internal or domestic factors, which negatively affected Korea in its endeavors to participate in the Conference. The most compelling factor in this perspective is the President Rhee, Syngman's foreign policy to seek reparations from Japan tenaciously and his strong anti-Japan sentiment which left no room for the negotiators of the Republic of Korea to compromise with the policy of the Allied Powers who wanted to rebuild and enable Japan to stand against the expansion of Communism in the Northeast Asian region. Another reason for its failure is that Korea neglected its diplomatic efforts to persuade the U. K. who also played a key role in finalizing the Peace Treaty together with the U. S. A., but opposed the idea that Korea would become a signatory of the Treaty. The deficiency of diplomatic infrastructure of the Republic of Korea who had only two or three year experience of diplomacy since the liberation from the Japanese colonial rule and the lack of interest of the people on the issue of Korea's participation in the Peace Treaty also served as negative factors. Although the Republic of Korea could not attend the San Francisco Peace Conference, it succeeded in adding some clauses in the Peace Treaty through tough negotiations with the U. S. A. as a kind of reward. The newly added clauses later enabled Korea to start a bilateral meeting with Japan to resolve the issues including property and claims. In this sense, President Rhee's foreign policy based on the strong anti-Japan sentiment, which led South Korea not to participate in the Peace Conference, should be re-examined in positive ways.
Abstract
The Republic of Korea had tried to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference in order to get reparations for the damages and losses under the Japanese colonial rule within the multilateral framework, to resolve the bilateral issues with Japan on the basis of the Peace Treaty, and to foster its status in the international community as a member of democratic countries. However, it failed to do so. Most of the advanced researches to study on the factors that blocked Korea's participation in the Conference are focused on the external ones, such as opposition by the U. S. A and the U. K. who refused to recognize the Korea's status as an Allied Power, and the change of the U. S. government's postwar policy toward Japan, which conflicted with Korea's strong demand for reparations from Japan. The purpose of this paper is to examine the Korea's internal or domestic factors, which negatively affected Korea in its endeavors to participate in the Conference. The most compelling factor in this perspective is the President Rhee, Syngman's foreign policy to seek reparations from Japan tenaciously and his strong anti-Japan sentiment which left no room for the negotiators of the Republic of Korea to compromise with the policy of the Allied Powers who wanted to rebuild and enable Japan to stand against the expansion of Communism in the Northeast Asian region. Another reason for its failure is that Korea neglected its diplomatic efforts to persuade the U. K. who also played a key role in finalizing the Peace Treaty together with the U. S. A., but opposed the idea that Korea would become a signatory of the Treaty. The deficiency of diplomatic infrastructure of the Republic of Korea who had only two or three year experience of diplomacy since the liberation from the Japanese colonial rule and the lack of interest of the people on the issue of Korea's participation in the Peace Treaty also served as negative factors. Although the Republic of Korea could not attend the San Francisco Peace Conference, it succeeded in adding some clauses in the Peace Treaty through tough negotiations with the U. S. A. as a kind of reward. The newly added clauses later enabled Korea to start a bilateral meeting with Japan to resolve the issues including property and claims. In this sense, President Rhee's foreign policy based on the strong anti-Japan sentiment, which led South Korea not to participate in the Peace Conference, should be re-examined in positive ways.
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